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This dissertation consists of two essays that are organized as chapters. In the first chapter, I 
examine the effect of presidential elections on the timing of turning points of stock market cycles 
in the United States. The empirical results from duration analysis show that compared to at other 
times, a market trough, the end of a bear market, is more likely in the period before an election 
when the incumbent is a Republican; meanwhile a market peak, the end of a bull market, occurs 
sooner following a Republican election victory. There is also evidence suggesting that bear 
markets are less likely to end after an election of a Republican president than in other periods. 
Results from further examination reveal that political control, the political alignment between the 
president and Congress, has a vital role in the timing of the turning points relative to the 
elections. In particular, political control found to reduce the probability of a market trough in the 
pre-election period and this reduction in the hazards for a bear market prior to an election is more 
significant for a Democratic president. Alternatively, political control boots the prospect of the 
completion of a bull market in the post-election period, especially when a Democrat was elected. 
Finally, political control in Congress can substantially shorten the duration of a bear market in 
the post-election period when the Republicans control both the White House and Capitol Hill.  
 
In the second chapter, I develop a dynamic factor model to examine the relations among 
presidential elections, investor sentiment, and stock market returns simultaneously.  Results in 
the study uncover that there is a sizeable improvement of investor sentiment prior to an election, 
and this pre-election upsurge in sentiment can explain a substantial portion of the presidential 
election cycle effect in the stock returns. However, data in the study fail to provide significant 
evidence that Democratic presidents can install more optimism in the stock market. My result 
does confirm that there was a market-wide panic during the height of the recent financial crisis in 
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2007-2008. Furthermore, results from the asset pricing tests show that in addition to the 
conventional risk factors, the market return factor and the factor of change in investment 
opportunity set, the factor of investor sentiment is a critical component in asset pricing and 
prediction. By including the sentiment factor, the proposed Augmented Intertemporal Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (AICAPM) in the paper improves upon the explanatory and predictive 
power of other competing models such as the Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model of 
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Chpater 1. Presidential Elections, Political Control, and Duration of Stock Market Cycles 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the effect of presidential elections on the timing of turning points of stock 
market cycles in the United States. The empirical results from duration analysis show that 
compared to at other times, a market trough, the end of a bear market, is more likely in the period 
before an election when the incumbent is a Republican; meanwhile a market peak, the end of a 
bull market, occurs sooner following a Republican election victory. There is also evidence 
suggesting that bear markets are less likely to end after an election of a Republican president 
than in other periods. Results from further examination reveal that political control, the political 
alignment between the president and Congress, has a vital role in the timing of the turning points 
relative to the elections. In particular, political control found to reduce the probability of a 
market trough in the pre-election period and this reduction in the hazard for a bear market prior 
to an election is more significant for a Democratic president. Alternatively, political control can 
boost the prospect of the completion of a bull market in the post-election periods, especially 
when a Democrat was elected. Finally, political control in Congress can substantially shorten the 
duration of a bear market in the post-election period when the Republicans control both the 





JEL classification: G14, D72, D73 




"By the Law of Periodical Repetition, everything which has happened once must happen again, 
and again, and again -- and not capriciously, but at regular periods, and each thing in its own 
period, not another’s and each obeying its own law... The same nature which delights in periodical 
repetition in the sky is the Nature which orders the affairs of the earth. Let us not underrate the 
value of that hint." -- Mark Twain 
 
Every four years, money and power collide at the intersection of Wall Street and 
Pennsylvania Avenue. Some of the most interesting historical patterns in the Stock Trader’s 
Almanac relate to the occurrence and the outcome of presidential elections in the United States. 
Over the years, academics and market pundits have conducted numerous studies on the subject 
of the election cycles in an attempt to make a better prediction of future market trends. It has 
been widely discovered that in general, the U.S. stock market tends to ascend with an upcoming 
election and to descend once the election is over. Besides, the historical returns in the U.S. stock 
market have been higher under Democratic presidencies than under Republican administrations. 
Some have suggested that these two periodic patterns in the equity market related to elections are 
the reflections of the political business cycles in the financial market as stock prices reflect 
investors’ forecasts of the future state of economy and firms.  
 
Theories of political business cycles present different implications concerning the 
temporal relationships between elections and business cycle turning points. For instance, 
opportunistic political business cycle theories suggest that a business cycle trough, the beginning 
of an expansion phases of the business cycle, is likely in the period before an election as an 
incumbent attempts to maximize his chance of reelection. Meanwhile, a business cycle peak, the 
beginning of the contraction phase of a business cycle, follows soon after an election as the pre-
election stimulus is quickly reversed. Rational partisan theory, on the other hand, suggests that a 
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business cycle peak is more likely to occur in the wake of a Republican presidential victory than 
at other times, and is less likely after a Democratic presidential victory than at other times. 
Conversely, a business cycle trough is less likely after a Republican has won a presidential 
election than at other times, and is more likely after a Democrat has won than at other times.  
 
To predict the future market movements is a critical task for all investors.  It is 
impossible for one to predict future market movements correctly all the time, but that does not 
mean the stock market does not have patterns that could meaningfully add to investors’ profits. It 
being said, history could be a good guide and a useful tool in considering entry and exit points in 
the stock market. There is a vast literature on the relationship between the stock market and 
macroeconomic fundamentals.1 Since a major factor that affects the real economy is the 
economic policies of an incumbent government, its strategic decision for reelection or partisan 
preferences should have an impact on stock market movements. This potent critical link, 
however, has not been studied yet.   
 
This study expands the existing literature on political economics and finance by 
investigating the temporal links between elections and stock market turning points in the United 
States. Specifically, I am interested in the following questions: 1) Compared to at other times, 
whether a bear market is more likely to end in the period leading up to a general election and 
                                                 
 
 
1  See for example, Bodie (1976), Fama (1981), Geske and Roll (1983), Cutler, et al. (1989), Boyd, Hu, and 
Jagannthan. (2005), Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002), Hong, Torous, and Valkanov.2007), Diebold and Yilmaz 




whether the end of a bull market is more likely in the period shortly after the election; 2) 
Whether there are any differences in the likelihood of turning points across political parties. 
 
Previous studies on the subject of election cycles in the U.S. stock market address the 
timing issue indirectly by focusing on the amplitude of returns and volatilities before and after 
the elections or across the tenure of different parties. This study provides a more direct test of the 
relationships between political and financial events. I use duration analysis to test whether the 
likelihood of the occurrence of a stock market cycle turning point in the United States (that is, 
either the end of a bear market or the end of a bull market) can be significantly affected by the 
occurrence and the outcome of an election. 
 
Duration analysis is well suited for analyzing the temporal links between elections and 
stock market turning points. It allows for directly testing the determinants of the likelihood of the 
end of a market cycle phase in any period conditional upon the phase lasting up until that period. 
The determinants of the timing of turning points that I focus on in this study are the occurrence 
and the outcome of elections. Duration analysis enables an estimate of the effect of elections on 
the likelihood of the end of a stock market cycle phase holding constant other factors. In 
particular, duration analysis controls for duration dependence that arises when there is a 
changing probability of the end of a stock market cycle as the cycle itself progresses.2 
                                                 
 
 
2 Various studies have provided evidence of duration dependence in stock market. For example, Zhou and Ridgon 
(2011) find evidence of negative duration dependence in all samples of bull markets and evidence of positive 
duration dependence in complete, peacetime and post-World War I sample of bear markets. Using a duration-
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The empirical results reported in the paper provide no statistical evidence that an ongoing 
bear market is more likely to end in the period before an election than in other periods regardless 
of the political party of the president. I do find, however, a significant increase in the likelihood 
of the end of a bear market ceterus paribas in the 24-month and the 16-month periods before an 
election when a Republican is incumbent. Data in the study fails to generate significant evidence 
that bull markets are more likely to end in the post-election period. 
 
The result of post-election effects is further examined by disaggregating post-election 
period according to which party won the election. Results show that there is a significant rise in 
the likelihood of a market peak, the end of a bull market, occurring immediately after a 
Republican election victory and a significant decrease in the likelihood of a market trough, the 
end of a bear market, in the two years following an election of a Republican president. There is, 
however, no evidence of potential changes in the behavior of the stock market after  Democratic 
election victories. 
 
Results also show that political alignment between the White House and Congress, 
political control, has a critical role in the timing of the turning points relative to the elections. 
Compared to the presidents who have no political control, market troughs, the ends of bear 
markets, are less likely to occur in the pre-election period when the new administrations are 
politically aligned with Congress regardless of the partisanship. This reduction in the hazard for 
                                                 
 
 
dependent Markov-switching model, Maheu and McCurdy (2000) find declining hazard functions (negative duration 
dependence) in both the bull and bear market states using monthly data from 1834-1995. 
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a bear market in the pre-election period is especially significant for Democratic incumbents. On 
the other hand, there is a significant upsurge in the likelihood of a market peak, the end of a bull 
market, following an election when the party of the elected president has full control over 
Congress. This increase in the hazard for a bull market in the post-election period is more advent 
for Democratic presidents. Finally, political control seems to let the Republican presidents 
substitute a higher likelihood of a market trough in the post-election period when the 
Republicans control both chambers of Congress for a lower one when they do not have such 
political advantage.  
 
Because of the limited number of stock market cycles I have, I conduct two robustness 
tests in the study. First, to ensure the results are indeed related the presidential elections, not 
driven by some outliers in the data, I exclude the observations from the 1929 stock market crash 
period and the 2008 market crash period from my sample and find consistent results. I then 
replicate the study using the nominal stock prices as an alternative measure of the general market 
condition, and the new results reaffirm my initial findings.  
 
In the next section of the paper, I provide a brief review of related literature and talk 
about hypotheses development. The empirical approach used to test my hypotheses is discussed 
in Section 3, which is followed by the empirical results presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents 
the results when the effect of political control is considered in regressions. Finally, before 





1.2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development  
1.2.1.  Literature Review 
Based on their assumptions across different dimensions, theories of political cycles can 
be classified into a two by two matrix. One of the dimensions concerns the nature of the 
economy itself. For example, the early models, such as that by Nordhaus (1975), Lindbeck 
(1976) and Hibbs (1977), assume that the economy is characterized by a stable inflation-output 
tradeoff, policymakers have direct control over inflation, and that inflation expectations are 
adaptive. More recent work expands early models by reflecting the rational expectation critique 
of these assumptions. The underlying assumptions of Persson and Tabellini (1990), Rogoff and 
Sibert (1988), Rogoff (1990) and Alesina (1987), for example, are that economic agents are 
forward-looking and make decisions based upon all information available to them at the time. 
The link between attempted political manipulation and the phases of the business cycle is more 
tenuous under these rational expectations assumptions than under the traditional assumption of a 
stable Phillips curve. In other words, there is a little scope for pre-election stimulation of the 
aggregate economy since the dates of quadrennial elections are known in advance, and the post-
election effects are more short-lived when people are rational and forward-looking than when 
there is a stable Phillips curve in the traditional models. 
 
The motivation of policymakers represents another critical aspect along which models of 
political business cycles can be categorized. Opportunistic political business models, such as 
Nordhaus (1975), assume that the goal of all policymakers is to maximize the chance to be 
reelected, and policy is used towards this end. In the rational opportunistic political business 
model of Persson and Tabellini (1990), the forwarding-looking behavior of economic agents 
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mitigates the extent to which the economy can be manipulated by policy and makes the voters’ 
goal to elect the most “competent” candidate regardless of ideology. 
 
The goal for policymakers in partisan political business cycle models is not reelection but 
instead realizing ends commensurate with their ideology. In the work of Hibbs (1977, 1987), in 
which politicians can exploit a stable output-inflation tradeoff, this leads to differences across the 
tenure of left-wing (Democratic) and right-wing (Republican) governments. The rational partisan 
theory of Alesian (1987) preserves the assumption of policymakers pursuing ideological motives 
but tempers their ability to realize their goals by modeling an economy characterized by rational 
wage-setters who are temporarily bound by nominal contracts. In this model, wages are set equal 
to expected inflation. In the period before an election, the expected inflation rate is a weighted 
average of the likelihood of the election of the party more sensitive to costs of inflation (the 
Republicans) and the party less sensitive to inflation’s costs (the Democrats). The election 
outcome determines the actual inflation rate and therefore whether the real wages are 
unexpectedly high (due to a Republican victory) and there is a contraction or whether the real 
wage is unexpectedly low (due to a Democratic victory) and there is an expansion. The length of 
the deviation of output from its natural rate in the model is the length of the wage contract, not 
the entire tenure of the administration as the Hibbs’ model suggests. 
 
The theories present different implications regarding the temporal relationship between 
elections and business cycle turning points. Opportunistic political business cycle theory predicts 
a higher likelihood of a business cycle trough (the end of a contraction) with the coming of an 
election. This theory also predicts that the onset of contraction (a business cycle peak) to offset 
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the pre-election simulative policy is more likely following an election than at other times. These 
predictions stand regardless of presidents’ partisanship.  Alternatively, the party in power is 
central to the timing of business cycle turning points drawn from the insights of the partisan 
theory. Rational partisan theory predicts that the likelihood of a business cycle peak marking the 
end of an expansion is higher after the election of a Republican president than at other times and 
is lower after the election of a Democratic president than at other time. This theory also predicts 
that the likelihood of a business cycle trough marking the end of an expansion is lower after the 
election of a Republican president than at other times and higher after the election of a 
Democratic president than at other times.  
 
Klein (1996) is the first one and probably the only one, who directly tests the timing 
implications of theories of political business cycles by using the dates of turning points of the 
business cycles identified by the National Bureau of Economic Research. The empirical results 
in his paper show that there is some evidence supporting the prediction from the opportunistic 
political business theory of an increased likelihood of the end of a contraction in the two-year 
period before an election, but only when there is a Democratic president. Other results presented 
in his paper are consistent with the post-election downturn predicted by the theory. Further 
examination of the post-election results shows consistency with rational partisan theory. There is 
a significantly higher likelihood of the end of an expansion occurring in any given month in 
periods following Republican presidential victories, and contractions are less likely to end 
following a Republican presidential victory than at other times but are more likely to end in the 
wake of a Democratic presidential victory than at other times.  
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Along with the research on theories of political business cycles, there is an increasing 
number of studies focusing on the relationships between the elections and the stock market. On 
the one hand, more and more studies recognize that stock market performance is a better 
predictor of presidential elections than the conventional economic indicators. It was widely 
believed that the state of the election-year economy is the most effective single predictor of the 
election outcomes (e.g., Jones, 2002; Fair, 2002). However, recent studies such as Chan and 
Jordan (2004) find that the equity market’s performance for ten months prior to an election is a 
better predictor than GDP growth of the incumbents’ election results in recent years. Similarly, 
Prechter, Goel, Parker, and Lampert (2012) find that compared to GDP, inflation, and 
unemployment rate, stock market performance is a more powerful predictor of the incumbent’s 
reelection bids. As a result, incumbents might try to massage the economy and introduce market-
friendly policies in the run-up to an election to foster a sense of prosperity to boost the chance of 
reelection. Such stimulation may result in a rising stock market before a coming election and 
sharp correction shortly after when the stimulus is withdrawn. 
 
On the other hand, whether there are predictable patterns in the U.S. stock market relate 
to the occurrence and the outcome of the elections has been the subject for various research. 
Allvine and O’Neill (1980) find that stock prices rise relative to trend over the two years prior to 
a presidential election. Since then, Herbst and Slinkman (1984), Huang (1985), G?̈?rtner and 
Wellershoff (1995, 1999) all find evidence in support of a four-year presidential election cycle in 
the United States, which suggests that the U.S. stock market generally provides higher returns in 
the last two years of a presidency than in the initial two years. Lobo (1999) also finds that stock 
volatility is higher in election years relative to nonelection years. Booth and Booth (2003) 
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reaffirm the early findings and conclude that this presidential election cycle cannot be explained 
by the traditional business conditions proxies, the term spread, dividend yield, and default 
spread. There also are differences in returns and volatility along partisan lines. Riley and 
Luksetich (1980) and Hobbs and Riley (1984) find that stock returns are higher under 
Republican administrations in the United States. Huang and Schlarbaum(1982) and Huang 
(1985), however, find higher stock market returns during Democratic presidencies. For Hensel 
and Zimeba (1995) and Johnson, Chittenden, and Jensen (1999), the higher stock market returns 
during Democratic administrations are a manifestation of the small-firm effect, since they find 
that only small firms have significantly higher returns under Democratic presidencies, while the 
returns for large firms are not statistically different across the administrations of both major 
parties. In addition to finding higher returns on small-cap stocks, Lobo finds that the jump risk 
obtained from the volatility of the stock market is higher during Democratic administrations as 
well. Results from Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) suggest the higher excess return in the stock 
market under Democratic presidencies is attributable to a difference in unexpected returns.  
 
1.2.2. Hypotheses Development 
The aforementioned studies have paved the way to the question of whether the 
quadrennial election cycle can significantly affect the timing of turning points of stock market 
cycles in the United States. Based on the existing literature, I hypothesize the followings: 
 
Hypothesis One: Compared to at other times, a bear market is more likely to end in the 
period leading up to an election; and a bull market is more likely to complete in the period 
immediately after an election regardless of the political party of the president.  
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Hypothesis Two: The likelihood of the end of a bull market is higher in the wake of a 
Republican election victory than at other times and is lower after a Democratic election victory. 
The likelihood of the end of a bear market is lower after an election of a Republican president 
than at other times and is higher after a Democratic election victory than in other periods. 
 
1.3.  Empirical Approach 
The timing of the stock market cycle turning points relative to the quadrennial presidential 
election cycle implied by my hypotheses lends itself to an empirical investigation using duration 
analysis. The data used in duration analysis consist of spells. In this study, a spell represents the 
number of months in either a bear market or a bull market. The focus of duration analysis is the 
hazard function. The hazard function at time 𝑡, ℎ(𝑡, 𝑥(𝑡)), is an estimate of the probability of the 
completion of a spell during the time interval (𝑡, 𝑡 +  𝑑𝑡), given that the spell has lasted up until 
time 𝑡. I estimate the hazard function for the probability of a peak (trough) in the U.S. stock 
market cycle during the next month given that the market has been in a bull (bear) market up 
until the beginning of that month3. The hazard function allows for duration dependence if its 
value at any moment is a function of the time already spent in a spell. The hazard function may 
shift due to exogenous factors, represented by the vector 𝒙(𝒕), which are called covariates. In a 
continuous-time framework, the hazard function is defined as 




                                          (1)                                                                              
                                                 
 
 
3 The regular quadrennial nature of U.S. election cycles insures that there is not a simultaneity problem whereby the 
spells determine the covariates. This problem may arise when studying a country with parliamentary system in 
which elections can be called at the discretion of the ruling party.   
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The hazard function can be understood as the probability of a turning point in the short interval 
𝑑𝑡 after 𝑡, conditional on the current phase of the market cycle has lasted until time 𝑡. 
 
There are several potential candidates for the functional form used to implement this 
analysis. The focus of attention in this study is the effect of the election covariates on the hazard 
rather than the estimation of the duration dependence of bull markets or bear markets. Therefore, 
I estimate the Cox proportional hazard model. This model factors the hazard into an arbitrary 
and unspecified baseline hazard, ℎ0(𝑡), and a function that depends upon a vector of explanatory 
variables, 𝒙(𝒕), and the associated vector of coefficients, 𝜷, as follows; 
ℎ(𝑡, 𝑥(𝑡), 𝛽, ℎ0) = ℎ0(𝑡) exp(𝑥(𝑡)𝛽)                                         (2) 
This specification satisfies the requirement of non-negativity of the hazard without imposing any 
restrictions on the coefficients 𝜷. The exponent of the coefficient on pre-election or post-election 
covariates can be interpreted as the shift of the hazard during the relevant period as compared to 
the other times. 4 
 
The focus of this study is a set of covariates representing specified periods before or after 
elections. These pre-election and post-election periods are identified by dummy variables that 
enter as time-varying covariates, that is, covariates that can change over the course of a spell.5  
                                                 
 
 
4 The arbitrary baseline hazard of the Cox proportional hazard model can have any shape and it is not estimated. The 
proportional hazard specification is well suited for investigating the effect of covariates on the relative risk of ending 
a spell, but it does not lead itself to an investigation of duration dependence.    
5 It is important to use time-varying covariates rather than simply identify those business cycles in which there was 
an election with a dummy variable that serves as a constant covariate because the longer the business cycle the more 
14 
 
Each of these covariates represents one of three different time frames and correspondingly is set 
equal to one in the 8-month, 16-month, or 24-month period either before or after an election. 6 
The use of different time frames for the covariates allows for the investigation of the length of 
the period of the political effect on the hazard. The coefficients across different specifications of 
time frames are directly comparable since the hazard is the estimate of the likelihood of the 
completion of a market cycle phase in the next month conditional on its lasting up until that 
month. 
 
To shed light on how the hazards may depend on the underlying state of the economy, I 
consider the effect of time-varying interest rates in some specifications as well.7 Interest rate 
levels may be affected by a low-frequency component and therefore might not contain the same 
information over a sample as long as mine, whereas interest rate changes are more likely to track 
business cycle variation across the full sample. Thus, I include both levels and changes in 
interest rates. 8 The coefficients on the pre-election and post-election covariates represent the 
shift in a hazard during the specified period before or after an election, respectively, holding 
                                                 
 
 
likely that there would be an election during it. Therefore, the use of elections as a constant covariate would give 
rise to spurious results.  
6 In an alternative specification of the post-election covariates begin in the month following the new president’s 
inauguration if he represented a different political party from his predecessor and began in the month after the 
election otherwise. This alternative is specification is more consistent with the notion that once in power, the 
government was able to affect the economy, while the specification based only on election dates is more consistent 
with the notion the effect of the election on the stock market was due to the “news” revealed by the outcome of the 
election. In any case, the results using either specification were very similar.   
7 Interest rates have been widely document to closely track the state of the business cycle and appear to be a key 
determinant of stock returns at the monthly horizon (see, e.g., Kandel and Stambaugh 1990; Fama and French 1988)   
8 My analysis of nominal stock prices uses nominal interest rates, whereas our analysis of real stock prices is based 
on real interest rates. Both interest rates are collected from Sheller’s database. 
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constant the effect of duration dependence and controlling for the underlying economy (if 
interest rates are included).  
 
The pre-election and post-election covariates used in tests of Hypothesis One do not 
distinguish between political parties. Hypothesis One predicts positive coefficients on the pre-
election covariates in hazard estimates for bear markets. This infers that bear markets that have 
lasted until the period before an election are more likely to end at that time than at other times. 
The predicted post-election market downturn from the hypothesis is consistent with positive 
coefficients on post-election covariates in hazard estimates for bull markets. 
 
The set of post-election covariates used to test Hypothesis Two includes separate 
covariates for the period after the election of a Republican president and for the period after the 
election of a Democratic president. Hypothesis Two says that the post-election effect depends 
upon the party won the election. Consistent with this hypothesis, estimates of hazard function for 
bull markets would include positive coefficients on the covariates representing the period 
following the election of a Republican president and negative coefficients on coefficients on the 
covariates representing the period following the election of a Democratic president. The 
hypothesis also predicts the estimates of hazard functions for bear markets include negative 
coefficients on the covariates representing the period following the election of a Republican 
president and positive coefficients on the covariates the represent the period following the 




It is reasonable to expect that the effects of presidential elections on the stock market 
cycle turning points may differ across sub-periods of the almost century and a half over which I 
have data. Accordingly, I estimate hazard functions for the full set of 44 bears and 43 bulls in the 
United States since 1872 as well as for subsamples of the 28 bears and 28 bulls in the period 
after World War I and the 22 bears and 21 bulls in the period after World War II. 
 
1.4. Empirical Results 
The key data in this analysis of the links between political and financial events are the 
dates of turning points of stock market cycle in the U.S. In this study, a turning point is when the 
stock market trend turns, i.e., goes from being generalized upward-moving to generalized 
downward-moving or vice versa. The upward-moving period is commonly called a bull market, 
and the downward-moving period is known as a bear market. Although bull and bear markets are 
familiar words to investors, there is no general academic definition for them.9 To identify these 
market trends, I adopt the algorithm developed by Pagan and Sossounov (2003).10 The turning 
points are peaks and troughs of the identified stock market cycles.11  Since inflation has varied 
considerably over my sample period, and it can be argued that drift in the nominal prices does 
not have the same interpretation during periods of low and high inflation. To deal with effects 
                                                 
 
 
9 Recent usage in the financial press seems to have refined this to insist on the rise (fall) of the market being greater 
(less) than either 20% or 25% in order to qualify for these names. In many ways the more general definition given in 
the study would seem to be closer to that used to describe contractions and expansions in the business cycle 
literature while the new definition, by emphasizing extreme movements, would like analogous to ‘booms’ and ‘bust’ 
in the real economy.  
10 Procedure for programmed determination of turning points can be seen in the Appendix.  
11 I account a peak or a trough as the final month of the bull market or bear market, respectively. 
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arising from this, I choose the real prices as a proxy for the general market. The nominal prices 
are later used as an alternative proxy for robustness test. 12  
 
My sample begins with the peak in July 1872 and ends with the trough in February 2016. 
There are 43 bull markets (periods from troughs to peaks) and 44 bear markets (periods from 
peaks to troughs) covered in the entire sample. The duration of each of these bears and bulls is 
presented in Table l. The final two columns in the table report whether an election was held 
during that phase of the market cycle. It can be seen from Table 1 that 24 of the 36 elections held 
over the entire sample occurred during bull markets. This is broadly consistent with the 
implication of Hypothesis One that incumbents attempt to generate rising markets in the period 
leading up to elections to increase their chance of being returned to office. 
 
Table 2 provides a first view of the timing of peaks and troughs relative to presidential 
elections. I calculate the number of months since the last election for each of the turning points 
by subsamples as well as by the party of the president. Except for the Democratic administrations 
in the post-World War II period,  the average number of months between the last election and a 
market peak is consistently lesser than the average number of months between the last election 
and a market trough across samples and across political parties. This is in line with Hypothesis 
One that bull markets tend to end soon after a presidential election and bear markets tend to end 
before a presidential election. Hypothesis Two predicts differences across Republican and 
                                                 
 
 
12 Both prices series are collected from Sheller’s database. http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm 
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Democratic administrations. Comparing the second and third panels of Table 1 shows that on 
average, peaks occur sooner after the election of a Republican than after the election of a 
Democrat. Also, on average, troughs occur later following Republican election victories than 
following Democratic victories. The standard deviations for all these statistics, however, are 
quite large relative to the averages. 
 
Further information about the distribution of the number of months between market cycle 
turning points and elections is provided in the histograms in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows 
marked differences in the distribution of the number of months since the previous election across 
peaks and troughs. For the full sample, the mass points in the histogram of troughs occur later 
than the mass points in the histogram of peaks. Although this pattern reverses for the subsamples 
cover the later periods, it can be seen that there are much more peaks than troughs occur in the 
period shortly after an election.  Histograms that differentiate across presidential parties are 
presented in Figure 2. The histograms of troughs indicate that more than half of the troughs 
occur in the first two years after a Democratic won the election while this portion is consistently 
below 45 percent for the two years after the elections of Republican presidents in the post-World 
War I and the post-World War II periods. The histograms of peaks, on the other hand, show that 
there are much more peaks occur within 8 months of the election of a Republican president than 
the election of a Democratic president.  
 
While the above summary statistics are suggestive, more robust tests of the hypotheses 
are provided by duration analysis. Unlike the unconditional estimates in Table 2, duration 
analysis allows me to test the effects of elections on stock market cycles holding constant the 
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effects of other factors such as the underlying economy and the time on the market cycle itself. 
The estimates of the Cox proportional hazard models for bear markets with the various pre-
election periods serving as time-varying covariates are presented in Table 3. Although all the 
estimated coefficients on the pre-election dummy variables are of the expected positive sign, the 
only coefficients that significantly differ from zero are the 16-month covariate in the post-World 
War II period. Thus, the prediction of Hypothesis One that there is a higher likelihood of a bear 
market ending in the period before an election than in other periods (conditional upon its having 
lasted until that period) is not strongly supported by the data. A similar finding is also reported 
by Kelvin (1996) that there is no reliable evidence that a contraction in the U.S. business cycle is 
more likely to end in the period before an election than in other periods. 
 
Hypothesis One does not suggest that there should be a difference across political parties 
in attempts to engineer a market expansion in the period before an election. It may be, however, 
that the likelihood of a bear market ending in the period before an election depends upon the 
party in power at the time. This possibility is investigated in Table 4. In that table, the covariates 
representing the period before an election distinguish between those times when a Republican 
holds the presidency and those times when a Democrat sits in the White House. As above, 
positive and significant values of the estimated coefficients would demonstrate a greater 
likelihood of the end of a bear market in the period leading up to an election than at other times.  
 
As can be seen in Table 4, there is no evidence that a bear market is more likely to end in 
the period before an election than at other times when the incumbent is a Democrat. 
Interestingly, however, the coefficients on the dummy variables representing the pre-election 
20 
 
period when there is a Republican president not only are all of the expected positive sign, but 
also those on the 24-month and the 16-month covariates are highly significant across samples. 
The coefficients on the 8-month covariate are also statistically significant in the Post-World War 
I period when a Republican is incumbent. Moreover, the point estimates on each of the 
covariates representing the period when there is a Republican president increase as the sample is 
restricted from the full sample to the subsamples. For instance, the estimates suggest that for the 
full sample, an ongoing bear market is 2.12 [𝑒𝑥𝑝 (0.75)] times more likely to end in any given 
month during the 16 months before an election when a Republican is a president than at other 
times. This likelihood of the end of a bear market in next month by virtue of an upcoming 
election and a Republican presidency rises to 3.00 [𝑒𝑥 𝑝(1.100)] when the sample is constrained 
to the post-World War I era and 3.11 [𝑒𝑥 𝑝(1.134)] when the sample is further constrained to the 
post-World War II era. Wong and McAleer (2009), too, find that, compared to Democrat 
presidents, Republican presidents tend to have greater cause to engage in active manipulation in 
the equity market to win reelections. 
 
Table 5 presents the estimates for bull markets with post-election periods serving as time-
varying covariates. Hypothesis One suggests that there is a higher likelihood of a bull market 
ending in the period shortly after an election than in other periods conditional on its having lasted 
until that period. This would be reflected in positive coefficients on the post-election covariates. 
Although none of the estimated coefficients on the post-election covariates is statistically 
different from zero, results in Table 5 exhibit some support for the hypothesis. For instance, the 
estimated coefficients on the post-election covariates are all of the expected positive sign. Within 
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any one sample period, the coefficient on the 8-month covariate is larger than the coefficient on 
either the 16-month or the 24-month covariates, which is also consistent with the hypothesis.13 
 
Tests of Hypothesis Two requires a more disaggregated specification that distinguishes 
between the parties in power. As discussed above, I use a specification that has separate time-
varying covariates for the months since the election of a Republican and the months since the 
election of a Democrat. Hypothesis Two suggests that the likelihood of the end of a bull market 
is higher after the election of a Republican and lower after the election of Democrat than at other 
times. In hazard estimates of bull markets, this implies that the coefficients on the covariates 
representing the period after a Republican presidential election victory are positive while those 
on the period following a Democratic victory are negative. Hypothesis Two also suggests the 
likelihood of the end of a contraction is lower after the election of a Republican president and 
higher after the election of a Democrat than at other times. In hazard estimates of bear markets, 
this implies that the coefficients on the covariates representing the period in the wake of 
Republican presidential victory are negative and the coefficients on the covariates representing 
the period after a Democratic presidential victory are positive.  
 
Results presented in Tables 6 and 7 provide support for Hypothesis Two as regards the 
effects of Republican presidential election victories in the post-World War I and post-World War 
                                                 
 
 
13 The consistent positive coefficients on the covariate for interest rate levels seem to suggest that increasing in 
interest rate increases the hazard for a bull market. Additionally, the covariate is significant at the 10 percent level 
for both the 8-month and the 16-month time frames in the post-World War II sample.  
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II periods. In the estimates of the hazards for bull markets presented in Table 6, the estimated 
coefficients on the covariates representing the period after an election of a Republican are all of 
the expected positive sign. Specifically, those for the 8-month covariate are significant at the 10 
percent level when interest rates are not included in the specification for the post-World War I 
sample and the 5 percent level for the post-World War II sample, respectively. The coefficient on 
the 16-month covariate is also significant at the 5 percent level when interest rates are excluded 
from the specification for the post-World War II sample. The second aspect of the hypothesis 
that a bull market is less likely to end in the period following the victory of a Democratic 
president, however, finds less support in the data. Although some of the coefficients on the 
Democratic covariates are of the expected negative sign, none of them reaches the conventional 
levels of significance. 14 
 
The coefficients on the Republican covariates are consistently larger than the 
corresponding coefficients on the post-election covariates that do not differentiate between the 
party of the president in the post-World War I and post-World War II estimates. As with the 
results in Table 5, the coefficients on the periods following the election of a Republican president 
are most significant for the 8-month covariate. For instance, the estimates suggest that a bull 
market is 2.86 [𝑒𝑥𝑝 (1.051)] times more likely to end within 8 months of a Republican victory 
than at other times in the post-World War I period and 4.3 [𝑒𝑥𝑝(1.456)] times more likely to 
                                                 
 
 
14 There are only two instances of a peak within 8 months of a Democratic presidential victory in the post-World 
War II period implying that the result for the post-World War II period in Table 5 is largely due to periods following 
a Republican presidential victory.  
23 
 
end within 8 months of an election of a Republican in the post-World War II period. This 
suggests that the post-election effect in hazards of bull markets has become more pronounced 
over time for the Republicans. 
 
Results presented in Table 7 for the estimates for hazard functions for bear markets 
exhibit some effects consistent with Hypothesis Two.15 As expected, the coefficients on the 
covariates representing the period following an election of a Republican president are all 
negative, and those for the 24-month covariate are significant at the 10 percent level in the post-
World War I and the post-World War II periods when the regressions control for the underlying 
economic condition. These point estimates suggest that compared to at other times, there is a 57 
percent reduction in the likelihood of a bear market ending in the two years following a 
Republican presidential election victory in the post-World War I period and this reduction in the 
hazard for a bear market rises to 63 percent in the post-World War II period.16 While coefficients 
on the Democratic covariates are all of the expected positive sign in the post-World War II 
period, none of them is significant at the conventional levels. Thus, the data fails to support 
Hypothesis Two that a bear market is more likely to end in the period following the victory of a 
Democratic candidate than in other periods.  
 
 
                                                 
 
 
15 There is only one instance of a stock market trough in the 8 months following the election of a Democratic 
president in the post-World War II period, making the estimate of the coefficient on the Democratic covariate for tis 
sub period is impossible.  
16 [1- 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−0.842)]=57% and [1- 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−0.976)]=63% 
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1.5. Political Control and Duration of Stock Market Cycles 
Since presidents of the United States share authority with Congress, and they frequently 
have a little or no control over congressional actions, it is difficult to see presidents manipulating 
policies without support from Congress. Yantek (1986) argues that the degree of manipulation by 
an incumbent president is mostly dependent on whether the president and Congress share the 
same party affiliation. Congressional influence on the presidential cycle effects is, however, 
largely overlooked in the existing research. In this section, I fill this void by examining whether 
political alignment between the White House and Congress, political control, would attenuate or 
exacerbate the temporal links between elections and timing of turning points in the stock market. 
To investigate this effect of political control, I construct a dummy variable, Congress, which 
equals to one when the same political party controls the White House and Congress, and I 
interact it with the covariates representing the pre- and post-election periods.17 I then re-estimate 
the above regressions controlling for political alignment between the White House and Congress. 
New estimates are presented in Tables 8-12.  
 
As seen in Table 8, after controlling for the political alignment between the White House 
and Congress, clear evidence emerges that an ongoing bear market is more to end in the pre-
election period when the party of the incumbent is not the majority in Congress. The new 
coefficient estimates on the pre-election period dummies not only are all of the expected positive 
                                                 
 
 
17 Congress is controlled by the Democratic Party or the Republican Party when the party has control (holds the 
majority of seats) of both the House of Representatives and the House of Senate simultaneously (i.e. complete 
control of the legislative branch in the nation). 
25 
 
sign but also those corresponding to the covariates representing the 24-month and the 16-month 
periods before an election are highly statistically significant. Furthermore, the point estimates for 
coefficients on the 24-month and the 16-month covariates and their statistical significance 
increase over time. In particular, these estimates suggest that controlling for interest rates and 
duration dependence, an ongoing bear market is 2.60 [𝑒𝑥𝑝(.956)] times more likely to end in 
any given month during the 16 months before an election than in other periods when the 
incumbent has no political control in Congress. This likelihood of the end of a bear market in the 
next month by virtue of a proximate election and absence of political control in Congress rises to 
5.28 [𝑒𝑥𝑝(1.664)] and 6.51 [𝑒𝑥𝑝(1.873)] when the sample is constrained to the post-World 
War I period and the post-World War II period, respectively. Similarly, the likelihood of a bear 
market ending in any given month during the two-year period before an election when there is no 
political control for the incumbent rises from 2.78 [𝑒𝑥𝑝(1.022)] for the full sample to 3.65 
[𝑒𝑥𝑝(1.296)] for the post-World War I subsample and to 12.34 [𝑒𝑥𝑝(2.513)] for the post-World 
War I subsample. 
 
Estimated coefficients on the political control dummy variable, Congress, are all of a 
positive sign and those for the 24-month and 16-month covariates are significant at the 5 percent 
level and 1 percent level in the post-World War I subsample and the post-World War II 
subsample, respectively. The positive coefficients suggest that, in general, political control can 
shorten the duration of a bear market. Despite this positive level effect of political control, 
coefficients on the interaction term, Election*Congress, are all of a negative sign and those for 
the 24-month and 16 month periods are significant at the 5 percent level and the 1 percent level 
in the post-World War I period and the post-World War II period, individually. These negative 
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estimates imply that political support from Congress attenuates the pre-election surge in the 
hazards for bear markets.18 Specifically, the point estimates show that there is a sizeable 
difference in the hazards in the pre-election period between an incumbent with political control 
and a one without such political privilege. For instance, a market trough is about 1 [𝑒𝑥𝑝(−4.488)] 
percent as likely to occur in the two years prior to an election when Congress is in the control of 
the president’s party as when the presidential party does not have such control in the post-World 
War II era. 
 
Table 9 displays stronger evidence that bear markets are more likely to end in the run-up 
to an election when there is a Republican president conditioning on whether the president has 
control in Congress or not. The inclusion of political control in the regressions improves the 
coefficient estimates on the covariates representing the time when there is a Republican president 
both economically and statistically. Besides, coefficients on the covariates representing the 24-
month and 16-month periods before an election when there is a Democratic incumbent are all of 
the expected positive sign and the coefficient estimates are significant in some cases. 
 
                                                 
 
 
18 One possible interpretation for the negative congressional effect in the hazards in the pre-election period is that the 
range of policy tools available to the government to win support from voters may increase when the party of an 
incumbent has the complete control over Congress. The incumbent could choose policies that benefit voters more 
directly, such as increasing transfer payments, and lowering taxes prior to an election rather than trying to 
manipulate the stock market.  
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Parallel to the results in Table 8, coefficient estimates on Congress remain positive and 
are most significant for the subsamples. The negative coefficient estimates on the interaction 
terms, Republican*Congress and Democratic*Congress, indicate that political control 
diminishes the prospect of a market trough occurring in the pre-election period.19  The higher 
point estimates on Democratic*Congress suggests that this reduction in the hazard of a bear 
market in the pre-election period is more evident for Democratic incumbents. In fact, the 
estimates infer that political control can completely offset the pre-election increase in the 
likelihood of a market trough when the president is a Democrat. 
 
Contrary to Hypothesis One, the negative coefficients on the covariates for the post-
election time dummies in Table 10 suggest bull markets are less likely to end following an 
election when the Oval Office and Congress do not share the same partisanship.20 Coefficients 
on the 24-month covariates are significant at the 5 percent level for the full sample and the 10 
percent level for the subsamples when interest rates are included as covariates. Moreover, the 
point estimates imply that there is a remarkable difference in the hazard for a bull market 
between in the two-year period after an election of a president who has no political control in 
Congress and at other times. Precisely, the likelihood of the end of a bull market, given its 
                                                 
 
 
19 There is no instance of a market trough in the pre-election periods when the Republican party controls both the 
White House and Congress simultaneously in the post-World War II period, making the estimate for the coefficient 
on the Republican*Congress for this sub-period impossible. Also, there are insufficient observations for estimating 
the coefficient on the Democratic*Congress for the 8-month time period.  
20 One potential explanation for the negative sign is that it is less likely for the elected presidents to take policies to 
reverses the stimulus policies employed before elections immediately after the elections are over when the new 
governments are not politically well aligned with Congress.  
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survival up until that time, is 34 [𝑒𝑥𝑝(−1.801)] percent as likely to occur within two years after 
an election when there is no political control for the president as at other times in the full sample 
period. The larger point estimates for the post-World War I and post-World War II subsamples 
are even more striking; the likelihood of a bull market ending within 24 months of an election 
when the party of the elected president does not control both houses of Congress is 23 
[𝑒𝑥𝑝(−1.477)] percent as likely as at other times in the post-World War I period and is less than 
20 [𝑒𝑥𝑝(−1.607)] percent as likely as at other times in the post-World War II period.  
 
The negative coefficients on Congress suggest that political alignment with Congress 
usually prolong the duration of a bull market. Within any one sample period, the point estimates 
for the covariate representing political control and their level of significance are found to 
increase as the time frame is restricted from the 8-month period to the 16-month period to the 24-
month period. Alternatively, coefficients on the interaction term, Election*Congress, are all of a 
positive sign and many of them are statistically different zero. These positive estimates suggest 
that there is a higher likelihood of a market peak following an election when Congress is 
dominated by the party of an elected president. To illustrate the economic significance of this 
joint effect in the hazards for bull markets, the coefficient in the post-World War II sample is 
taken as an example. The coefficient suggests that, for the post-World War II sample, an ongoing 
bull market is 55 [𝑒𝑥𝑝(4.017)] times more likely to end in any given month during the two-year 
period after an election when Congress is controlled by the party of the new president than when 
the new government and Congress do not share the same party affiliation. Furthermore, the 
magnitude of estimates on the covariate for political control and interaction term increases as the 
sample is restricted from the full sample to the post-World War I subsample to the post-World 
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War II subsample. This suggests that the congressional influence in the timing of turning points 
relative to elections has become more noticeable over time.   
 
After taking into account the effect of political control, Table 11 shows that there is no 
longer evidence that a bull market is more likely to end in the period following an election of a 
Republican. The new estimates on the covariates representing the periods following a 
Republican election victory are all statistically insignificant. Some are even with a negative sign. 
The negative estimates for the coefficients on the Democratic covariates in the full sample, on 
the other hand, exhibit some effects consistent Hypothesis Two that a bull market is less likely to 
end in the period following an election of a Democrat than at other times. Moreover, the 
coefficients on the covariate presenting the two years following an election a Democrat is found 
to be significant at the 5 percent level for the full sample.  
 
As the results in Table 10, the point estimates for the coefficient on Congress continue to 
be negative, and they are significantly different from zero for the subsamples when interest rates 
are not included.  Besides, the coefficients on the covariate representing the political alignment 
in Congress are found to be significant at the 5 percent level for the 24-month period in the full 
sample as well. The positive coefficients on the interaction terms, Republican*Congress and 
Democratic*Congress, imply that in the post-election period, a bull market is more likely to end 
when the executive branch and the legislative branch are simultaneously controlled by the same 
political party. Furthermore, the coefficients in the full sample period show that this joint effect 
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is more significant for Democratic presidents than for Republican presidents. 21 Specifically, the 
point estimates suggest that the likelihood of a market peak in the two years after an election of a 
Democratic president who is supported by a Congress controlled by Democrats is 20 
[𝑒𝑥𝑝(2.989)] time as likely as when the president does not have such support. While this 
likelihood of a market peak in the two years after a Republican election victory when the 
Republicans control Congress is 6.34 [𝑒𝑥𝑝(1.847)] times as likely as when the Republicans are 
not the majority in Congress. Additionally, the coefficients on Republican*Congress reveals that 
effect of political control in hazards of bull markets following Republican election victories are 
most noticeable in the post-World War II subsample, the most recent sample period. 
 
Finally, results in Table 12 offer enhanced evidence of a market trough is less likely to 
occur following an election of a Republican president when Congress is not in the control of the 
Republicans than at other times. The new estimates on the covariates representing the period 
following an election of a Republican not only are all of the expected negative sign but also 
those for the 16-month and 24-month periods are significant at the conventional levels in many 
cases.22 The insignificant coefficients on Congress suggest that political control itself does not 
have a meaningful effect on the hazards for bear markets. However, the estimates on the 
interaction term, Republican*Congress, are all of a positive sign and are highly significant in 
                                                 
 
 
21 There are insufficient observations for estimating the coefficients on Democratic*Congress for the post-World 
War I and the post-World War II samples. There are insufficient observations for estimating the coefficients on 
Democratic*Congress for the 8-month and 16-month periods for the full sample as well.  
22 There are insufficient observations for estimating the coefficients on Democratic*Congress and the coefficients 
on Republican*Congress for the 8-month period.   
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most cases. These point estimates suggest that political alignment between the president and 
Congress causes a sizeable difference in the hazards for bear markets in the post-election period 
between when the elected Republican president enjoys full support from Congress and when the 
new administration is not entirely backed up by Congress. For instance, the point estimate in the 
post-World War II subsample period suggest that the likelihood of a market trough to occur in 
the two years following an election when the Republicans have both the White House and 
Congress is nearly 125 [𝑒𝑥𝑝(4.829)] times as likely as when the elected Republican president 
who is not politically aligned with Congress after controlling for economic condition and for 
duration dependence..23   
 
1.6. Robustness Tests 
As a robustness test, and to ensure that the above results are not driven by some outlier in 
my sample, I exclude the observations from the 1929 stock market crash period and the 2008 
market crash period from the sample. The results produced by the new sample data are mostly 
the same as the original results. 24 As an additional robustness test, I consider the nominal stock 
prices as an alternative measure of the general market condition. Table 13 reports the dates of 
turning points of the new cycles identified by using nominal prices and the duration of each of 
the new bear and bull markets and whether an election was held during that phases of the cycle. 
                                                 
 
 
23 Coefficients on the Interest Rate Changes in the post-World War II are all significant at the 1 percent level. These 
negative coefficients indicate that rising in interest rate changes reduces the hazards for bear markets.  
24 To save space, I did not report the estimates for the robustness tests in the paper. These new estimates are 
available upon request. 
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Again, the elections held during the bull markets are twice as many as the elections held during 
the bear markets. The statistics on the timing of new turning pints relative to previous elections 
presented in Table 14 are almost identical to the statistics in Table 2. On average, bull markets 
tend to end soon after an election and bear markets tend to end before an election. Compared to 
the Republican election victories, market troughs occur sooner and peaks occur later after the 
Democratic presidential elections. Histograms in Figures 3 and 4 present similar patterns in the 
distribution of months between market cycle turning points and last elections as the patterns in 
Figures 1 and 2.  For the full sample, the mass points in the histogram of peaks occur sooner than 
the mass points in the histogram of troughs. There are more peaks than troughs occur in the 
periods immediately after the elections. Histograms in Figure 4 show that there are more troughs 
in the pre-election period when the incumbents are Republicans than when the incumbents are 
Democrats. Nearly 60 percent of the market troughs during the Republican presidents occur in 
the two years before the elections while this proportion is below 40 percent for Democratic 
presidents. Furthermore, there are more peaks occur in the 8 months following an election of a 
Republican than a Democratic victory. Finally, the estimates from the Cox regressions reaffirm 
my earlier findings.  
 
1.7.  Conclusions 
This study provides a more direct test of the timing of stock market cycle turning points 
relative to the elections in the United States than previous research, which only considers the 
amplitude of returns and volatility before and after presidential elections. Empirical results from 
duration analysis provide evidence suggesting that the likelihood of a market trough, the end of a 
bear market, is higher in the period before an election than in other periods, but only when a 
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Republican is a president. Further examination of the post-election effect reveals a difference by 
the party of the victorious presidential candidate. Consistent with Hypothesis Two, bull markets 
are found to be more likely to end following Republican presidential victories than at other 
times. Also, consistent with the hypothesis is the finding that bear markets are less likely to end 
following a Republican election victory.  
 
Results from additional tests uncover that political control, the political alignment 
between the White House and Congress, holds a vital role in the timing of turning points of the 
stock market cycles relative to the elections. In particular, compared to the pre-election period 
when there is no political alignment between the Oval Office and Capitol Hill, there is a reduced 
chance for a bear market ending in the run-up to an election when the incumbent has full support 
from Congress regardless of the political party of the president. This reduction in the likelihood 
of a market trough, marking the end of a bear market, in the pre-election period is particularly 
evident for the Democratic incumbents. Alternatively, there is a substantial upsurge in the 
likelihood of the end of a bull market following an election when the elected president and 
Congress share the same partisanship. This rise in the likelihood of a market peak in the post-
election period is more noticeable following a Democratic election victory. Finally, political 
control seems to let the Republican presidents substitute a higher likelihood of a market trough in 
the post-election period when the Republicans control both houses of Congress for a lower 
possibility when they do not have such political advantage.  
 
 
This paper does not intend to provide a complete test of the election effects in the U.S. 
stock market as there are other implications that cannot be addressed by using duration analysis. 
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The findings presented in this paper, however, undoubtedly complement the existing literature 
and expand our knowledge of how presidential elections in the U.S. can affect its financial 
markets. A better understanding of the relationships between the timing of turning points of 
stock market cycles and political events is not only central to our understanding of the empirical 
relevance of political business cycle theories in financial markets but also it could help investors 
















































Table 1.1 Dates of Turning Points in U.S. Stock Market 
 
 
Trough Peak Bear Bull Bear Bull
7/1872
11/1873 2/1876 16 27 YES NO
6/1877 6/1881 16 48 YES YES
6/1882 7/1883 12 13 NO NO
6/1884 11/1886 11 29 NO YES
3/1888 5/1890 16 26 NO YES
12/1890 5/1892 7 17 NO NO
7/1893 4/1894 14 9 YES NO
4/1895 9/1895 12 5 NO NO
8/1896 9/1897 11 13 NO YES
5/1898 3/1899 8 10 NO NO
9/1900 6/1901 18 9 NO YES
10/1903 9/1906 28 35 NO YES
11/1907 8/1909 14 21 NO YES
7/1910 6/1911 11 11 NO NO
12/1914 12/1915 42 12 YES NO
1/1919 7/1919 37 6 YES NO
12/1920 3/1923 17 27 YES NO
10/1923 9/1929 7 71 NO YES(2 ELECTIONS)
6/1932 7/1933 33 13 NO YES
3/1935 2/1937 20 23 NO YES
4/1938 11/1938 14 7 NO NO
5/1942 4/1946 42 47 YES YES
2/1948 6/1948 22 4 NO NO
6/1949 1/1953 12 43 YES YES
9/1953 4/1956 8 31 NO NO
12/1957 7/1959 20 19 YES NO
10/1960 12/1961 15 14 NO YES
6/1962 1/1966 6 43 NO YES
10/1966 12/1968 9 26 NO YES
7/1970 4/1971 19 9 NO NO
11/1971 1/1973 7 14 NO YES
12/1974 9/1976 23 21 NO NO
3/1978 8/1978 18 5 YES NO
4/1980 11/1980 20 7 NO YES
7/1982 6/1983 20 11 NO NO
7/1984 8/1987 13 37 NO YES
12/1987 8/1989 4 20 NO YES
10/1990 1/1992 14 15 NO NO
10/1992 8/2000 9 94 NO YES(2 ELECTIONS)
2/2003 12/2004 30 22 YES YES
10/2005 10/2007 10 24 NO NO
3/2009 2/2011 17 23 YES NO
9/2011 5/2015 7 44 NO YES
2/2016 9 NO
Date of Duration (in months) Was an Election Held during the
Notes: Along a row, Bear market refers to period from peak in pervious row to trough in the next row. Bull market refers to 
period from trough in that raw to peak in that row.
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Av'g (s.d.)  Min. Max. Obs. Av'g (s.d.)  Min. Max. Obs. 
Full Sample 22.60(13.96) 0 46 43 26.52(13.09) 1 47 44
Post WWI 21.96(15.05) 0 46 28 26.21(13.49) 1 47 28
Post WWII 23.48(16.14) 0 46 21 26.91(13.37) 4 47 22
Republican Administrations
Av'g (s.d.)  Min. Max. Obs. Av'g (s.d.)  Min. Max. Obs. 
Full Sample 21.59(15.07) 0 46 27 27.31(13.66) 1 47 26
Post WWI 21.13(16.76) 0 46 16 28.06(14.30) 1 47 16
Post WWII 21.43(17.64) 0 46 14 28.46(13.11) 10 47 13
Democratic Administrations
Av'g (s.d.)  Min. Max. Obs. Av'g (s.d.)  Min. Max. Obs. 
Full Sample 24.31(12.12) 3 45 16 25.39(12.52) 4 45 18
Post WWI 23.08(13.06) 3 45 12 23.75(12.50) 4 41 12






Months Since Last Election
Months Since Last Election
Months Since Last Election
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Table 1.3 Estimates of Hazard Functions for Bear Markets 
 
1. Full Sample
Equation Variable 24 months 16 months 8 months
A. Election 0.385 0.393 0.221
(0.28) (0.28) (0.36)
B. Election 0.424 0.411 0.235
(0.31) (0.28) (0.34)
Interest rates 0.053 0.047 0.048
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Interest Rate Changes -0.011 -0.023 -0.058
(0.05) (0.12) (0.08)
2. Post-World War I
Equation Variable 24 months 16 months 8 months
A. Election 0.211 0.337 0.153
(0.37) (0.30) (0.45)
B. Election 0.567 0.512 0.161
(0.41) (0.34) (0.42)
Interest rates -0.068 0.021 0.054
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Interest Rate Changes 1.075 ** 0.354 0.104
(0.49) (0.29) (0.19)
3. Post-World War II
Equation Variable 24 months 16 months 8 months
A. Election 0.448 0.642 * 0.547
(0.42) (0.36) (0.44)
B. Election 0.549 1.020 ** 0.851
(0.47) (0.45) (0.55)
Interest rates -0.074 -0.070 -0.043
(0.11) (0.08) (0.08)
Interest Rate Changes 0.785 1.128 0.679
(1.00) (0.71) (0.78)
Numbers in paranthesis are robust standard errors.
*,** and *** indicate coefficents are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Dummy Variables: Months Before an Election
Dummy Variables: Months Before an Election
Dummy Variables: Months Before an Election
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Table 1.4 Estimates of Hazard Functions for Bear Markets by Party  
 
1. Full Sample
Equation Variable 24 months 16 months 8 months
A. Republican 0.653 ** 0.741 ** 0.484
(0.31) (0.32) (0.38)
Democratic 0.056 0.118 -0.297
(0.36) (0.45) (0.71)
B. Republican 0.723 ** 0.750 ** 0.499
(0.36) (0.32) (0.38)
Democratic 0.105 -0.095 -0.285
(0.37) (0.44) (0.67)
Interest Rates 0.048 0.042 0.048
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Interest Rate Changes -0.044 -0.037 -0.061
(0.06) (0.11) (0.09)
2. Post-World War I Dummy Variables: Months Before an Election, By Party
Equation Variable 24 months 16 months 8 months
A. Republican 0.747 * 1.005 *** 0.778 *
(0.45) (0.37) (0.46)
Democratic -0.479 -0.455 -0.871
(0.52) (0.60) (1.04)
B. Republican 0.897 ** 1.100 *** 0.829 **
(0.45) (0.34) (0.39)
Democratic -0.021 -0.293 -0.918
(0.54) (0.68) (1.00)
Interest Rates -0.070 -0.008 0.036
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Interest Rate Changes 0.953 ** 0.366 0.225
(0.46) (0.26) (0.20)
3.Post-World War II Dummy Variables: Months Before an Election, By Party
Equation Variable 24 months 16 months 8 months
A. Republican 0.977 ** 0.925 ** 0.479
(0.48) (0.47) (0.51)
Democratic -0.139 0.255 0.779
(0.54) (0.60) (0.52)
B. Republican 1.147 ** 1.134 ** 0.763
(0.51) (0.49) (0.55)
Democratic -0.086 0.728 1.222
(0.57) (0.81) (0.82)
Interest Rates -0.110 -0.067 -0.050
(0.11) (0.08) (0.08)
Interest Rate Changes 0.983 0.989 0.702
(0.98) (0.81) (0.81)
Numbers in paranthesis are robust standard errors.
*,** and *** indicate coefficents are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively .
Dummy Variables: Months Before an Election, By Party
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Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Election 0.172 0.039 0.031
(0.41) (0.32) (0.31)
B. Election 0.186 0.074 0.041
(0.41) (0.33) (0.32)
Interest rates 0.035 0.057 0.026
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Interest Rate Changes -0.018 -0.261 ** -0.269
(0.12) (0.13) (0.13)
2. Post-World War I
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Election 0.667 0.395 0.063
(0.48) (0.38) (0.44)
B. Election 0.629 0.419 0.093
(0.48) (0.41) (0.44)
Interest rates 0.107 0.103 0.042
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Interest Rate Changes 0.060 -0.163 -0.413
(0.39) (0.49) (0.60)
3. Post-World War II
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Election 0.543 0.529 -0.029
(0.57) (0.44) (0.51)
B. Election 0.540 0.371 -0.069
(0.57) (0.48) (0.51)
Interest rates 0.129 * 0.123 * 0.072
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Interest Rate Changes 0.119 0.463 0.143
(0.61) (0.82) (0.79)
Numbers in paranthesis are robust standard errors.
*,** and *** indicate coefficents are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively .
Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election
Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election
Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election
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Table 1.6 Estimates of Hazard Functions for Bull Markets by Party  
 
1. Full Sample Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election, By Party 
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Republican 0.348 0.236 0.027
(0.47) (0.37) (0.37)
Democratic -0.212 -0.323 0.037
(0.67) (0.49) (0.37)
B. Republican 0.350 0.211 -0.015
(0.47) (0.39) (0.37)
Democratic -0.184 -0.202 0.123
(0.68) (0.50) (0.40)
Interest Rates 0.032 0.050 0.029
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Interest Rate Changes -0.011 -0.242 * -0.280 **
(0.12) (0.13) (0.14)
2. Post-World War I
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Republican 1.051 * 0.710 0.069
(0.57) (0.53) (0.62)
Democratic 0.149 0.067 0.057
(0.70) (0.50) (0.45)
B. Republican 0.855 0.618 0.083
(0.58) (0.59) (0.70)
Democratic 0.292 0.208 0.100
(0.74) (0.53) (0.46)
Interest Rates 0.094 0.088 0.043
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Interest Rate Changes 0.043 -0.174 -0.411
(0.38) (0.48) (0.62)
3.Post-World War II
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months








Interest Rates 0.099 0.078 0.045
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Interest Rate Changes 0.130 0.513 0.140
(0.62) (0.78) (0.78)
Numbers in paranthesis are robust standard errors.
Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election, By Party 
Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election, By Party 
*,** and *** indicate coefficents are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
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Table 1.7 Estimates of Hazard Functions for Bear Markets by Party  
 
1. Full Sample
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Republican -0.397 -0.480 -0.296
(0.71) (0.43) (0.34)
Democratic -0.326 -0.799 * -0.509
(0.44) (0.43) (0.39)
B. Republican -0.410 -0.526 -0.369
(0.73) (0.45) (0.38)
Democratic -0.307 -0.783 * -0.478
(0.45) (0.42) (0.39)
Interest Rates 0.024 0.034 0.047
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Interest Rate Changes -0.036 -0.052 -0.002
(0.09) (0.91) (0.05)
2. Post-World War I
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Republican -0.675 -0.473 -0.455
(1.14) (0.55) (0.46)
Democratic 0.221 -0.251 0.199
(0.59) (0.50) (0.40)
B. Republican -0.775 -0.679 -0.842 *
(1.11) (0.55) (0.48)
Democratic 0.163 -0.310 -0.047
(0.61) (0.49) (0.43)
Interest Rates 0.026 0.043 -0.027
(0.06) (0.05) (0.07)
Interest Rate Changes 0.139 0.407 0.925 **
(0.19) (0.31) (0.42)
3.Post-World War II
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Republican − -0.910 -0.873
(0.58) (0.50)
Democratic 0.473 0.260 0.486
(0.58) (0.46) (0.46)
B. Republican − -0.831 -0.976 *
(0.61) (0.54)
Democratic 0.749 0.316 0.384
(0.67) (0.49) (0.50)
Interest Rates -0.039 -0.022 -0.030
(0.05) (0.05) (0.11)
Interest Rate Changes -1.556 ** -0.370 0.576
(0.74) (0.72) (0.92)
Numbers in paranthesis are robust standard errors.
*,** and *** indicate coefficents are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election, By Party
Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election, By Party
Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election, By Party
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Table 1.8 Estimates of Hazard Functions for Bear Markets with Political Control  
 
1. Full Sample
Equation Variable 24 months 16 months 8 months
A. Election 0.827 * 0.749 ** 0.347
(0.43) (0.36) (0.47)
Congress 0.456 0.350 0.104
(0.48) (0.41) (0.34)
Election*Congress -0.831 -0.779 -0.354
(0.63) (0.70) (0.86)
B. Election 1.021 ** 0.956 *** 0.440
(0.45) (0.36) (0.47)
Congress 0.707 0.538 0.203
(0.49) (0.43) (0.35)
Election*Congress -1.187 * -1.090 -0.585
(0.64) (0.71) (0.89)
Interest rates 0.081 * 0.048 0.035
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Interest Rate Changes 0.040 0.149 0.105
(0.06) (0.13) (0.10)
2. Post-World War I
Equation Variable 24 months 16 months 8 months
A. Election 0.995 * 1.133 *** 0.823
(0.53) (0.41) (0.57)
Congress 1.126 ** 0.977 ** 0.535
(0.54) (0.43) (0.45)
Election*Congress -1.852 ** -2.038 ** -1.879
(0.85) (1.02) (1.40)
B. Election 1.296 ** 1.664 *** 1.027 *
(0.52) (0.20) (0.61)
Congress 1.520 ** 1.557 *** 0.859
(0.60) (0.52) (0.56)
Election*Congress -2.283 ** -3.019 ** -2.578
(0.90) (1.20) (1.58)
Interest rates 0.106 * 0.093 0.064
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Interest Rate Changes 0.231 0.378 * 0.320
(0.24) (0.24) -0.17
3.Post-World War II
Equation Variable 24 months 16 months 8 months
A. Election 1.584 ** 1.677 *** 0.881
(0.62) (0.52) (0.59)
Congress 2.195 *** 1.994 *** 0.954
(0.60) (0.57) (0.60)
Election*Congress -3.513 *** -3.146 *** -0.918
(0.84) (0.91) (1.17)
B. Election 2.513 *** 1.873 *** 0.743
(0.75) (0.53) (0.84)
Congress 2.927 *** 2.158 *** 0.930
(0.86) (0.57) (0.59)
Election*Congress -4.488 *** -3.595 *** -0.525
(1.02) (0.82) (1.56)
Interest rates 0.079 0.062 -0.045
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08)
Interest Rate Changes -1.526 *** 0.057 -0.208
(0.47) (0.88) (0.48)
Numbers in paranthesis are robust standard errors.
*,** and *** indicate coefficents are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Dummy Variables: Months Before an Election 
Dummy Variables: Months Before an Election 
Dummy Variables: Months Before an Election 
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Table 1.9 Estimates of Hazard Functions for Bear Markets by Party with Political Control 
 
1. Full Sample Dummy Vriables: Months Before an Election
Equation Variable 24 months 16 months 8 months
A. Republican 0.918 ** 0.902 ** 0.554
(0.45) (0.40) (0.47)
Democratic 0.716 0.616 -0.274
(0.57) (0.52) (1.00)
Congress 0.448 0.386 0.112
(0.49) (0.41) (0.34)
Republican*Congress -0.418 -0.078 -0.155
(0.67) (0.76) (0.57)
Democratic*Congress -1.212 -1.877 * -0.048
(0.77) (1.00) (1.56)
B. Republican 1.072 ** 1.065 *** 0.625
(0.49) (0.41) (0.45)
Democratic 1.139 * 1.026 ** -0.142
(0.66) (0.52) (1.03)
Congress 0.787 0.657 0.210
(0.54) (0.45) (0.35)
Republican*Congress -0.481 -0.228 -0.354
(0.71) (0.74) (0.57)
Democratic*Congress -1.799 ** -2.473 *** -0.314
(0.88) (0.91) (1.58)
Interest Rates 0.112 * -0.079 0.035
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04)
Interest Rate Changes -0.045 0.126 0.095
(0.08) (0.13) (0.10)
2. Post-World War I
Equation Variable 24 months 16 months 8 months
A. Republican 1.285 ** 1.668 *** 1.111 **
(0.61) (0.41) (0.50)
Democratic 0.436 0.573 -1.216
(0.76) (0.74) (1.09)




Democratic*Congress -1.982 * -2.369 **
(1.04) (1.11)
B. Republican 1.503 *** 2.115 *** 1.285 **
(0.57) (0.54) (0.52)
Democratic 0.815 1.425 * -1.634
(0.96) (0.86) (1.16)




Democratic*Congress -2.501 ** -3.799 ***
(1.21) (1.06)
Interest Rates 0.094 0.091 * 0.056
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
Interest Rate Changes 0.315 0.503 * 0.329 **
(0.25) (0.21) (0.16)
Dummy Vriables: Months Before an Election
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3. Post-World War II
Equation Variable 24 months 16 months 8 months
A. Republican 2.549 *** 2.462 *** 0.916
(0.80) (0.83) (0.58)
Democratic 0.739 0.897 -0.091
(0.97) (1.03) (0.80)
Congress 2.728 *** 2.468 *** 0.967 *
(0.83) (0.80) (0.59)
Democratic*Congress -3.198 *** -2.952 ***
(0.95) (0.95)
Republican 2.650 *** 2.431 *** 0.794
(0.81) (0.83) (0.80)
B. Democratic 2.067 0.829 0.120
(1.43) (1.18) (0.91)
Congress 2.969 *** 2.467 *** 0.953 *
(0.87) (0.78) (0.57)
Democratic*Congress -4.179 *** -2.922 ***
(1.31) (1.08)
Interest Rates 0.060 0.018 -0.044
(0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Interest Rate Changes -1.314 ** -0.305 -0.202
(0.64) (0.62) (0.46)
Numbers in paranthesis are robust standard errors.
*,** and *** indicate coefficents are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Dummy Variables: Months Befoe an Election
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Table 1.10 Estimates of Hazard Functions for Bull Markets with Political Control  
 
1. Full Sample
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Election -0.716 -0.753 -1.113 **
(0.63) (0.56) (0.48)
Congress -0.516 -0.687 * -1.452 **
(0.33) (0.40) (0.58)
Election*Congress 1.465 * 1.368 * 2.367 ***
(0.84) (0.75) (0.78)
B. Election -0.714 -0.666 -1.081 **
(0.61) (0.56) (0.48)
Congress -0.519 -0.663 -1.388 **
(0.39) (0.43) (0.60)
Election*Congress 1.456 * 1.179 2.244 ***
(0.83) (0.78) (0.78)
Interest rates -0.011 0.008 -0.007
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Interest Rate Changes -0.011 -0.222 -0.100
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15)
2. Post-World War I
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Election -0.528 -0.480 -1.357
(1.01) (0.74) (0.88)
Congress -0.958 ** -1.233 ** -2.085 ***
(0.38) (0.50) (0.78)
Election*Congress 1.920 * 1.714 * 3.031 **
(1.19) (1.00) (1.22)
B. Election -0.470 -0.544 -1.477 *
(1.00) (0.76) (0.91)
Congress -0.821 * -1.113 ** -2.047 **
(0.44) (0.56) (0.84)
Election*Congress 1.842 1.756 * 3.212 ***
(1.16) (1.03) (1.23)
Interest rates 0.048 0.056 0.052
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
Interest Rate Changes 0.401 0.009 0.139
(0.40) (0.46) -0.42
3.Post-World War II
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Election -0.498 -0.448 -1.082
(1.04) (0.75) (0.90)
Congress -1.076 * -1.648 * -2.195 *
(0.59) (0.90) (1.18)
Election*Congress 2.115 2.448 * 3.001 *
(1.48) (1.42) (1.04)
B. Election -0.549 -1.057 -1.607 *
(1.04) (0.77) (0.88)
Congress -0.955 -1.534 -2.436 *
(0.82) (1.09) (1.48)
Election*Congress 2.256 3.035 ** 4.017 **
(1.54) (1.52) (1.84)
Interest rates 0.077 0.114 0.157 *
(0.09) (0.07) (0.09)
Interest Rate Changes 0.205 1.355 ** 1.150 *
(0.79) (0.60) (0.66)
Numbers in paranthesis are robust standard errors.
*,** and *** indicate coefficents are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively 
Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election
Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election
Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election
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Table 1.11 Estimates of Hazard Functions for Bull Markets with Political Control by Party  
 
1. Full Sample
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Republican -0.307 -0.162 -0.825
(0.62) (0.55) (0.61)
Democratic -0.162 -0.251 -1.723 **
(0.67) (0.52) (0.75)
Congress -0.401 -0.425 -1.458 **
(0.32) (0.35) (0.58)




B. Republican -0.315 -0.139 -0.812
(0.64) (0.58) (0.63)
Democratic -0.108 -0.177 -1.660 **
(0.67) (0.51) (0.80)
Congress -0.292 -0.415 -1.416 **
(0.37) (0.39) (0.60)




Interest Rates 0.005 0.013 -0.017
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09)
Interest Rate Changes -0.172 -0.223 -0.091
(0.13) (0.14) (0.16)
2. Post-World War I
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Republican 0.140 0.445 -0.351
(0.99) (0.81) (0.95)
Democratic 0.300 0.249 0.290
(0.68) (0.55) (0.51)
Congress -0.764 ** -0.759 * -0.822 *
(0.37) (0.43) (0.49)
Republican*Congress 1.517 0.614 0.934
(1.18) (1.06) (1.18)
B. Republican 0.043 0.245 -0.596
(1.05) (0.93) (1.15)
Democratic 0.359 0.319 0.356
(0.70) (0.56) (0.53)
Congress -0.663 * -0.685 -0.757
(0.41) (0.48) (0.51)
Republician*Congress 1.721 0.788 1.160
(1.22) (1.16) (1.36)
Interest Rates 0.048 0.046 0.054
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12)
Interest Rate Changes -0.477 -0.043 -0.044
(0.45) (0.43) (0.38)
Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election, By Party
Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election, By Party
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Table 1.11 (CONTINUED) 
 
  
3. Post-World War II
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months




Congress -1.104 ** -1.029 * -1.045 *
(0.56) (0.61) (0.65)
Republican*Congress3.395 ** 2.148 * 2.001
(1.66) (1.30) (1.34)




Congress -0.963 -0.777 -0.963
(0.70) (0.68) (0.68)
Republican*Congress3.558 ** 2.114 * 2.646 *
(1.61) (0.09) (1.51)
Interest Rates 0.067 0.100 0.143
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Interest Rate Changes0.006 0.944 0.422
(0.78) (0.74) (0.79)
Numbers in paranthesis are robust standard errors.
*,** and *** indicate coefficents are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election, By Party
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Table 1.12 Estimates of Hazard Functions for Bear Markets with Political Control by Party 
 
1. Full Sample Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election, By Party
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Republican -0.402 -0.985 * -0.618
(0.70) (0.60) (0.45)
Democratic -0.321 -0.750 * -0.433
(0.43) (0.42) (0.40)
Congress -0.024 -0.160 -0.212
(0.30) (0.33) (0.38)
Republican*Congress 1.384 * 0.874
(0.72) (0.74)
B. Republican -0.390 -1.060 * -0.809 *
(0.71) (0.57) (0.49)
Democratic -0.324 -0.725 * -0.323
(0.43) (0.41) (0.40)
Congress -0.003 -0.188 -0.310
(0.30) (0.35) (0.40)
Republican*Congress 1.795 ** 1.279
(0.75) (0.83)
Interest Rates 0.009 0.035 0.074
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05)
Interest Rate Changes 0.028 0.132 0.044
(0.09) (0.11) (0.06)
2. Post-World War I Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election, By Party
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Republican -0.637 -1.087 -0.857 *
(1.14) (0.75) (0.54)
Democratic 0.187 -0.171 0.493
(0.59) (0.49) (0.45)
Congress 0.126 -0.136 -0.455
(0.40) (0.45) (0.53)
Republican*Congress 2.153 *** 1.582
(0.82) (1.10)
B. Republican -0.648 -1.140 -1.102 **
(1.12) (0.74) (0.53)
Democratic 0.179 -0.197 0.546
(0.64) (0.52) (0.47)
Congress 0.205 -0.062 -0.424
(0.40) (0.42) (0.51)
Republican*Congress 2.126 *** 1.857 *
(0.82) (1.10)
Interest Rates 0.033 0.049 0.094
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06)




Table 1.12 (CONTINUED) 
 
  
3. Post-World War II Dummy Variables: Months Since an Election, By Party
Equation Variable 8 months 16 months 24 months
A. Republican -1.852 ** -1.406 **
(0.93) (0.60)
Democratic 0.158 0.155 0.848 *
(0.60) (0.55) (0.51)
Congress 0.732 * 0.169 -0.459
(0.44) (0.52) (0.56)
Republican*Congress 2.643 *** 2.841 ***
(0.99) (0.85)
B. Republican -1.901 * -2.573 ***
(1.03) (0.88)
Democratic -0.252 -0.061 0.818
(0.54) (0.55) (0.53)
Congress 0.544 0.145 -0.831
(0.45) (0.57) (0.54)
Republican*Congress 3.027 *** 4.829 ***
(1.16) (1.35)
Interest Rates -0.034 -0.068 0.072
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Interest Rate Changes-1.711 *** -1.379 *** -1.999 ***
(0.40) (0.50) (0.51)
Numbers in paranthesis are robust standard errors.
*,** and *** indicate coefficents are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
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Table 1.13 Dates of Turning Points in U.S.  Stock Market  (Nominal Prices) 
 
 
Trough Peak Bear Bull Bear Bull
5/1872
11/1873 4/1875 18 17 YES NO
6/1877 6/1881 26 48 YES YES
1/1885 5/1887 43 28 YES NO
6/1888 5/1890 13 23 NO YES
12/1890 8/1892 7 20 NO NO
8/1893 4/1894 12 8 YES NO
3/1895 9/1895 11 6 NO NO
8/1896 9/1897 11 13 NO YES
4/1898 4/1899 7 12 NO NO
9/1900 9/1902 17 24 NO YES
10/1903 9/1906 13 35 NO YES
11/1907 12/1909 14 25 NO YES
7/1910 9/1912 7 26 NO NO
12/1914 11/1916 27 23 YES YES
12/1917 7/1919 13 19 NO NO
8/1921 3/1923 25 19 YES NO
10/1923 9/1929 7 71 NO
6/1932 2/1934 33 20 NO YES
3/1935 2/1937 13 23 NO YES
4/1938 11/1938 14 7 NO NO
4/1942 5/1946 41 49 YES YES
2/1948 6/1948 21 4 NO NO
6/1949 1/1953 12 43 YES YES
9/1953 7/1956 8 34 NO NO
12/1957 7/1959 17 19 YES NO
10/1960 12/1961 15 14 NO YES
6/1962 1/1966 6 43 NO YES
10/1966 12/1968 9 26 NO YES
6/1970 4/1971 18 10 NO NO
11/1971 1/1973 7 14 NO YES
12/1974 9/1976 23 21 NO NO
3/1978 9/1978 18 6 YES NO
4/1980 11/1980 19 7 NO YES
7/1982 10/1983 20 15 NO NO
7/1984 8/1987 9 37 NO YES
12/1987 8/2000 4 152 NO
2/2003 10/2007 30 56 YES YES
3/2009 5/2011 17 26 YES NO
9/2011 5/2015 4 44 NO YES
2/2016 9 NO
Notes: Along a row, Bear market refers to period from peak in pervious row to trough in the next row. 
YES(3 ELECTIONS)
Bull market refers to period from trough in that raw to peak in that row.









Av'g (s.d.)  Min. Max. Obs. Av'g (s.d.)  Min. Max. Obs. 
Full Sample 23.28(14.21) 0 46 39 25.30(13.28) 2 47 40
Post WWI 23.08(15.06) 0 46 24 25.96(12.84) 4 47 25
Post WWII 25.33(16.15) 0 46 18 26.32(13.18) 4 47 19
Republican Administrations
Av'g (s.d.)  Min. Max. Obs. Av'g (s.d.)  Min. Max. Obs. 
Full Sample 23.39(15.37) 0 46 23 26.81(13.04) 7 47 19
Post WWI 22.85(17.23) 0 46 13 28.08(13.23) 9 47 13
Post WWII 23.55(18.35) 0 46 11 27.80(12.76) 10 47 10
Democratic Administrations
Av'g (s.d.)  Min. Max. Obs. Av'g (s.d.)  Min. Max. Obs. 
Full Sample 23.13(12.83) 0 45 16 23.63(13.90) 2 45 19
Post WWI 23.36(12.86) 3 45 11 23.67(12.54) 4 41 12




Months Since Last Election







Alesina, A. (1987). Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-Party System as a Repeated Game. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 102(3), 651-78. 
Alesina, A. (1988). Macroeconomics and Politics, In National Bureau of Economic Research 
Macroeconomics Annual, edited by Stanley Fischer, pp. 13-52. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. 
Alesina, A., & Noudel, R. (1992). Political Cycles in OECD Economies. Review of Economic 
Studies, 59(4), 663-688. 
Allvine, F. C., & O’Neil, D. E. (1980). Stock market returns and the presidential election cycle: 
Implications for market efficiency. Financial Analysts Journal, 36(5), 49-56 
Bodie, Z. (1976). Common Stocks as a Hedge against Inflation. Journal of Finance, 31(2), 307-
327. 
Booth, J. R., & Booth, L. C. (2003). Is the presidential cycle in security returns merely a 
reflection of business conditions?  Review of Financial Economics, 12(2), 131-159.  
Boyd, J. H., Hu, J., & Jagannathan, R. (2005) The Stock Market’s Reaction to Unemployment 
News: Why Bad News Is Usually Good for Stocks. Journal of Finance, 60(2), 649-672. 
Chan, A., & Jordan, B. (2004). The economy, the market, and presidential elections. Weekly 
Economic Review: Banc One Investment Advisors. 
Chan, A., & Jordan, B. (2004). The economy, the market, and presidential elections. Weekly 
Economic Review: Banc One Investment Advisors 
Choi, J. J., Hauser, S., & Kenneth, J. K. (1999). Does the Stock Market Predict Real Activity? 
Time Series Evidence from the G-7 Countries. Journal of Banking and Finance, 23(12), 1771-
1792.  
Cutler, D. C., Poterba, J. M., & Summer, L. H. (1989). What moves stock prices? Journal of 
Portfolio Management, 15(3), 4-13. 




Fama, E. F. (1981). Stock Returns, Real Activity, Inflation and Money. American Economic 
Review, 71(4), 545-565. 
Flannery, M., & Protopapadakis, A. (2002). Macroeconomic Factors Do Influence Aggregate 
Stock Returns. The Review of Financial Studies, 15(3), 751-782.  
G?̈?rtner, M. & Wellershoff, K. (1995). Is There an Election Cycle in American Stock Returns?. 
International Review of Economics and Finance, 4(4), 387-410 
Heckman, J., & Burton S. (1984). Econometric Duration Analysis. Journal of Econometrics, 24(1-
2), 63-132. 
Hensel, C. R., & Ziemba, W. T. (1995). United States investment returns during Democratic and 
Republican administrations, 1928-1993. Financial Analysts Journal, 51(2), 61-69. 
Herbst, A., & Slinkman, C. (1984). Political economic cycles in the U.S. stock market. Financial 
Analysts Journal, 4(2), 35-39. 
Hibbs, D. (1977). Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. The American Political Science 
Review, 71(4), 1467-1487. 
Hibbs, D. (1987). The American Political Economy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Hobbs G. R. and W. B. Riley (1984). Profiting from the presidential election. Financial Analysts 
Journal, 40(2), 46-53.  
Hong, H, Torous, W., & Valkanov, R. (2007). Do Industries Lead Stock Markets? Journal of 
Financial Economics, 83(2), 367-396. 
Huang, R. & Schlarbaum, G. (1982). Asset Returns and Presidential Elections. Working Paper, 
Krannert Graduate School of Management, Purdue University. 




Johnson, R., Chittenden, T., & Jensen, R. (1999). Presidential politics, stocks, bonds, bills, and 
inflation. The Journal of Portfolio Management, 26(1), 27-31. 
Jones, R. (2002). Who will be in the White House? Predicting presidential elections. New York, 
NY: Longman 
Kiefer, N. (1988). Economic Duration Data and Hazard Functions. Journal of Economic 
Literature, 26(2), 646-722. 
Klein, M. W. (1996). Timing Is All: Elections and the Duration of United States Business 
Cycles. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 28(1), 84–101. 
Lancaster, T. (1990). The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data, New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Lindbeck, A. (1976). Stabilization Policies in Open Economies with Endogenous Politicians. 
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 66(2), 1-19. 
Lobo, B. (1999). Jump risk the U.S. stock market: Evidence using political information. Financial 
Economics, 8(2), 149-163 
Maheu, J. M., & McCurdy, T. H. (2012). Identifying Bull and Bear Markets in Stock Returns. 
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 18(1), 100-112. 
Nordhaus, W. (1975). The Political Business Cycle. Review of Economic Studies, 42(2),169-90. 
Pantzalis, C., Stangeland, D. & Turtle, H. (2000). Political elections and the resolution of 
uncertainty: the international evidence. Journal of Banking and Finance, 24(10),1575–1604 
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1990). Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and Politics. London: 
Harwood Academic Publishers Press.  
Prechter, R. R., Goel, D., Wayne, D. P., & Lampert, M. (2012). Social Mood, Stock market 
Performance, and U.S. Presidential Elections: A Socionomic Perspective on Voting Results. 
SAGE OPEN, 2(4), 1-13 
61 
 
Riley, W., & Luksetich, W. (1980). The Market Prefers Republicans: Myth or Reality. The Journal 
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 15(3), 541-560.  
Rogoff, K. (1990). Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles.  American Economic Review, 80(1), 21-
36. 
Rogoff, K., & Sibert, A. (1988). Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycle. Review of 
Economic Studies, 55(1), 1-16. 
Romer, C. (1992). Remeasuring Business Cycles. National Bureau of Economic Research 
Santa-Clara, P., & Valkanov, R. I. (2003). The presidential puzzle: Political cycles and the stock 
market. Journal of Finance, 58(5), 1841-1872. 
Sichel, D. (1991). Business Cycle Duration Dependence: A Parametric Approach. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 73(2), 254-260 
Tufte, Edward R. (1978). “Political Control of the Economy.” Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Working Paper no. 4150  
Wong, W.K., & McAleer, M. (2009). Mapping the Presidential Election Cycle in US stock 
markets. Mathematics and Computers in Simulation, 79(11), 3267-3277.  
Yantek, T., & Cowart, A. T. (1986). Elections and Wall Street: Taking Stock of Parties and 
Presidents. Western Political Quarterly, 39(3), 390–412.  
Zhou, H. G., & Rigdon, S. E. (2011). “Duration Dependence in Bull and Bear Stock markets. 






Procedure for Determination of Turning Points: 
1. Determination of initial turning points in raw data. 
a. Determination of initial turning points in raw data by choosing local peaks 
(troughs) as occurring when they are the highest (lowest) values in a window 
eight months on either side of the date. 
b. Enforcement of alternation of turns by selecting the highest of multiple peaks (or 
lowest of multiple troughs). 
 
2. Censoring operations (ensure alternation after each). 
a. Elimination of turns within 6 months of beginning and end of series. 
b. Elimination of peaks (or troughs) at both ends of series which are lower or 
higher). 
c. Elimination of cycles whose duration is less than 16 months. 
d. Elimination of phases whose duration is less than 4 months (unless fall/rise 
exceeds 20%). 
 








Chpater 2. Presidential Elections, Investor Sentiment, and Stock Returns 
 
Abstract 
This study develops a dynamic factor model that allows for a simultaneous examination on the 
relationships among presidential elections, investor sentiment, and stock returns in the United 
States. Results reported in the paper uncover that there is a sizeable improvement of investor 
sentiment before an election. More importantly, this pre-election surge in investor sentiment can 
explain a substantial portion of the presidential election cycle effect in the U.S. stock returns. 
Furthermore, results from the asset pricing tests clearly show that investor sentiment is a critical 
component in asset pricing and prediction. By including the sentiment factor, the proposed 
Augmented Intertemporal Capital Asset Pricing Model (AICAPM) in the paper improves upon 
the explanatory and predictive power of other competing models such as the Intertemporal 
Capital Asset Pricing Model of Merton (1973) (ICAPM) and the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor 
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Over the years, researchers and market practitioners have examined whether the political 
process and stock market are interrelated. As part of those research efforts, one of the most 
commonly analyzed subjects is the relationship between presidential elections and the stock 
market in the United States. Extant research such as Herbst and Slinkman (1984) and Huang 
(1985) attempt to answer this question by examining the correlation between stock returns and 
the occurrence and the outcome of elections. Additionally, Nordhaus (1975) and Hibbs (1977, 
1987) establish that primarily, the goal of being re-elected and the differences in partisan 
preference are reflected in the macro-economy and hence, equity returns.  
 
However, a vastly ignored but essential factor in this discussion is the role of investor 
sentiment in the relationship between elections and the stock market. Naturally, presidential 
elections invoke a degree of sentiment in an investor, with the valence depending on the 
investor’s perception of the macroeconomic growth potentials and possible changes in fiscal and 
monetary policies before and after the elections. Recent studies such as Baker and Wurgler 
(2006, 2007) suggest that investor sentiment has a significant role in determining asset prices. 
Thus, a secondary channel through which presidential elections affect stock returns might be 
through the effect on investor sentiment. This secondary channel, however, is not yet studied by 
existing research. This paper contributes to the existing literature by formally studying this new 
hypothesis via examining the relationships among presidential elections, investor sentiment, and 




Until recent, investor sentiment had no role in asset pricing. Classical asset pricing 
models assume that investors are rational, will diversify to reduce the risk their portfolios, and 
the cross-section of systematic risk will determine the cross-section of expected returns in assets. 
Moreover, if any irrational investors exist, the effects of their actions will be nullified by that of 
arbitrageurs in the market. Hence, investor sentiment had no role in determining prices. 
However, evidence in recent studies such as Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) suggests that 
investor sentiment has a significant role in determining asset prices.  
 
There is yet a universally accepted academic definition of investor sentiment. In this 
study, investor sentiment is defined to be a latent psychological factor (i.e., market feeling or 
market mood), which can be affected by investors’ perceptions of political events and policy 
preferences of different political parties. Thus, to simultaneously study the relations among 
presidential elections, investor sentiment, and stock returns, a dynamic factor model is 
constructed. I employ the Kalman filter to estimate the unobservable risk factors in the model 
(i.e., investor sentiment).   
 
The maximum likelihood estimates show that there is a significant improvement of 
investor sentiment in the last two years of a presidency before an election. More importantly, this 
pre-election sentiment upsurge found to explain a significant portion of the higher returns in the 
election years, the election cycle effect in the U.S stock market. Moreover, the result confirms 
that there was a market-wide panic during the height of the recent financial crisis in 2007-2008. 
However, data in this study fails to provide evidence that investors are more optimistic when 
Democrats are sitting in the White House. Furthermore, with the extracted factors, I then 
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compare the performance of the proposed model in the paper, Augmented Intertemporal Capital 
Asset Pricing Model (AICAPM), with that of existing assets pricing models using the 25 size-
and BTM-sorted portfolios. Results from the asset pricing tests in both the in-sample and out-of-
sample contexts show that the proposed risk factors in the model are a crucial component in asset 
pricing and prediction. Particularly, the high explanatory and predictive power of the loading on 
the sentiment factor leads the AICAPM to outperform other competing models such as the 
ICAPM of Merton (1973) and the Fama-French (1993) 3-factor model (FF3) in both tests.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of 
related literature. The empirical method is discussed in Section 3. Section 4 describes the sample 
data, which followed by the empirical results presented in Section 5. In Section 6, I conduct in-
sample performance tests of the AICAPM and compare the results with those of alternative 
models. In Section 7, I perform out-of-sample tests and present pair-wise comparisons of the 
accuracy in 1-step ahead forecasts. Finally, Section 8 concludes the study.  
 
 
2.2. Literature Review 
The importance of the political process to the U.S. financial markets has been long 
recognized by market pundits and academia. Some of the most interesting patterns in the Stock 
Traders’ Almanac relate to the occurrence and the outcome of presidential elections. For instance, 
it has been widely documented that the U.S stock market generally ascends with a coming election 
and descends once the election is over. This pattern of higher returns in the second half of a 
presidency, the election years, than in the first half of a presidency is commonly referred to as the 
presidential election cycle. Studies such as Allvine and O'Neill (1980), Huang (1985), Gartner and 
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Wellershoff (1995) and Booth and Booth (2003) all find that the differences in returns across the 
first half and the second half of a presidential term are both economically and statistically 
significant. Huang even suggests that based on this presidential election cycle, i.e., switching 
investors out of stocks and into Treasury bills during the first two years of the presidential term 
can produce returns superior to a traditional buy and hold strategy. 
 
There are also differences in returns along the partisan lines. Huang (1985) reports that 
annual rates of return on stocks from 1929-1980 are stronger under Democratic presidents than 
under Republican presidents. Siegel (2002) find similar results over a more extended period from 
1888 to 2001. Johnson, Chittenden, and Jens (1999) study the period of 1929-1996, they fail to 
discern a partisan difference in the returns of the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index. However, they do 
find a pronounced party effect in favor of the Democrats when examining an index of small stocks. 
Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) discover that excess returns for the value-weighted and equal-
weighted portfolio are 9% and 16 % higher, respectively, under Democratic and Republican 
administrations for the period 1927:01-1998:12. They describe this pattern of higher returns during 
Democratic presidencies than during their counterparts as the presidential partisan cycle. 
 
How to explain these two presidential cycle effects has puzzled academics for years. 
Several market efficiency explanations have been put forward. First, the presidential cycle effects 
might merely proxy for variations in expected returns due to business cycle fluctuations. However, 
Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) and Booth and Booth (2003) find that the effects remain robust 
even after taking control of the business condition, individually. Second, the relationship between 
stock returns and the elections might be concentrated around and limited to election dates. Santa-
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Clara and Valkanov find no significant evidence of stock price changes immediately before, 
during, or immediately after presidential elections. Third, the difference in returns relative to 
elections might be the compensation for the additional risk. Market volatility could be simply 
higher in the second half of a presidential term or during Democratic presidencies, thereby 
explaining the higher returns. Santa-Clara and Valkanov and Campbell and Li (2004), however, 
indicate that the difference in returns cannot be justified by differences in market volatility, 
respectively. Finally, the presidential cycle effects might be driven by the impact of outliers in the 
sample data. Studies by Santa-Clara and Valkanov as well as G?̈?rtner and Wellershoff (1995) find 
that both presidential effects are not the result of individual outliers in the data. 
 
The failure of market efficiency explanations give rise to an interesting question: Do these 
patterns imply that the market is inefficient since the timing of the U.S. presidential election can 
be known in advance? While efficient market hypothesis and its prefect rationality assumption 
have contributed considerably to our understanding of asset pricing, they have been challenged by 
both academic and market professionals over the years. Traditional theories built on efficient 
market hypothesis claim that stock prices mirror the discounted value of expected cash flows and 
irrationalities among market participants are removed by arbitrageurs. In contrast, behavioral 
finance argues that when arbitrage is limited, investor sentiment can persist in financial markets 
and affect asset prices.  
 
Theoretically, Black (1986); De Long, Shleifer, Summer, and Waldmand (1990); 
Barberries, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) have modeled the role of investor sentiment in the 
financial markets. In their models, the economy is characterized by two types of investors: 
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professional investors who rationally anticipate asset prices and noise traders whose expectations 
lead to periods of over, or undervaluation, of financial assets. Both types of investors are risk-
averse and the equilibrium price reflects everyone’s expectations. It follows that noise traders’ 
sentiment influences asset prices. The theoretical studies point out that asset prices can 
significantly diverge from fundamental values. Moreover, because arbitrage has practical limits, 
rational investors fail to fully offset the effect of noise traders’ sentiment. Thus, the “noise trader 
risk”, also known as the “sentiment risk”, becomes a priced factor by financial markets. 
 
The risk introduced by noise traders in the financial markets may not be diversifiable 
because their views could be correlated and affect many assets. Therefore, assets subject to “noise 
trader risk” should provide higher returns than those assets not subject to that risk, and their price 
should be below their fundamental value. As noted by Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991, p81), “Like 
fundamental risk, noise trader risk arising from the stochastic investor sentiment will be priced in 
equilibrium. As a result, assets subject to noise trader risk will earn a higher expected return than 
assets not subject to such risk. Relative to their fundamental values, these assets will be 
underpriced”. 
 
Empirical studies have mostly explored the predictive ability of investor sentiment on the 
cross-section of stock returns (e.g., Clarke and Statman, 1998; Neal and Wheatly, 1998; Brown 
and Cliff, 2004; Lemmon and Portnaiguina, 2006; Baker and Wurgler, 2006, 2007). Few studies 
have tested the existence of noise trader’s systematic risk priced by financial markets. According 
to Zweig (1973), this type of tests is essential, as the question of whether investor sentiment drives 
returns is a necessary but insufficient condition for noise trader hypothesis. Additionally, the 
70 
 
studies were undertaken often led to mixed conclusions. Some show that financial markets do not 
price psychological factors (Elton, Gruber, and Busse, 1998; Sias, Starks, and Tinic, 2001; 
Glushkov, 2006). Others find that sentiment is a critical factor in the return generating process of 
common stocks (Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler, 1991; Lee, Jiang, and Indro, 2002; Kumar and Lee, 
2006). Therefore, the sentiment risk introduced by noise traders in the financial market remains an 
open empirical question.  
 
 There are even fewer studies have their focus on the relationship between presidential 
elections and investor sentiment. Daniel, Chong, and Bahram (2014) find that in addition to higher 
stock returns during Democratic presidencies, both investor sentiment and the covariance between 
investor sentiment and stock market are higher when Democrats control the White House. Adjei 
and Adjei (2017) also find that realized and excess returns are higher during Democratic 
presidencies than Republican presidencies. More interestingly, they find that investor sentiment 
levels are lower but improve during Democratic presidencies and are higher but decline during 
Republican presidencies. Furthermore, they infer that a Democratic president instills more 
optimism in the stock market that contributes to the higher returns during the term. Colon-De-
Armas, Rodriguez, and Romero (2017), on the other hand, examine the shifts in investor sentiment 
around the last seven U.S. presidential elections (1988 through 2012) as measured by changes in 
closed-end fund discounts. They find that the discounts are significantly diminished from two 
weeks before an election to a week before the election, and persist until the week after the election, 





The aforementioned studies have pointed out a link between presidential elections and 
stock returns, a link between investor sentiment and stock returns, and a link between 
presidential elections and investor sentiment. One of the contributions of this study to the 
existing literature is to connect those three separate links via empirically investigating the 
relationships among elections, investor sentiment, and stock returns at the same time. 
Specifically, I am interested in the following questions: 1) Whether investor sentiment changes 
with presidential elections? 2) If so, how much of the presidential cycle effects in stock returns 
can be related to the change in investor sentiment? To accomplish this, I propose a dynamic 
factor model with the factors being extracted via the Kalman filter. 25 Furthermore, with the 
extracted factors, this study makes another attempt to address the question of whether investor 




2.3. The Empirical Approach  
2.3.1. The Framework  
Stock and Watson (1989, 1991) form a composite index of coincident economic indicators 
based on the notion that co-movements in observed macroeconomic time series have a common 
component that can be captured by a single time-varying latent variable. Along the lines of Stock 
and Watson, I develop a multifactor model of stock returns, with each of the factors being latent 
and identified within a pre-specified factor structure. According to the Intertemporal Capital 
                                                 
 
 
25 My motivation for proposing a dynamic factor model is to incorporate features of price dynamics and the 




Asset Pricing Model of Merton (1973) (ICAPM), an asset’s expected return depends on its 
covariance with market return (𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇) and change in investment opportunity set (𝐷∆𝑂𝑃𝑃). 
However, like other models based on the efficient market hypothesis, the ICAPM does not allow 
for a role of investor sentiment either. To capture this missing psychological risk factor, I 
augmented the ICAPM with an additional risk factor, market sentiment (𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇). As a result, my 
proposed model decomposes the asset returns into four components: market return, change in 
investor opportunity set, sentiment, and idiosyncratic. Since the model is essentially an extension 




2.3.2. The Indicators  
In order to identify the proposed risk factors (𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇 , 𝐷∆𝑂𝑃𝑃 , 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇), a group of observable 
indicators are used. In existing studies, risk factors of the market return and the change in 
investment opportunity set are commonly approximated by return on a market portfolio or an 
index, and by innovations in a set of state variables that are believed to capture uncertainty about 
investment opportunities in the future, respectively. For this study, the indicator picked for the 
factor of market return is the return on the value-weighted CRSP index (𝑟𝑚), and the selected state 
variables are the short-term T-bill rate (𝑟𝑓), the term spread (𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚), the dividend yield (𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑), 
and the default spread (𝑑𝑒𝑓). There is yet a universally accepted measure of investor sentiment to 
date. Current financial literature proposes two main categories of proxies for investor sentiment, 
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direct and indirect indicators.26 Direct indicators are based on polling market participants through 
surveys. Alternatively, indirect indicators are made up of a time series of macroeconomic and 
financial variables used to represent the unobserved sentiment factor. To better capture investor 
sentiment in the stock market, I utilize both measures in this study. My direct measure of investor 
sentiment is obtained from Investors’ Intelligence (II) and the composite index constructed by 
Baker and Wurgler (2007) (BW) is my indirect measure. 
 
 
2.3.3. Model Specification and Factor Identification  
Given that market capitalization (size) and book-to-market equity (BTM) are found to 
relate to investor sentiment and change in investment opportunity set (see Baker and Wurgler, 
2006; Petkova, 2006), I conjecture that the 6 size- and book-to-market equity (BTM) sorted 
portfolios could provide useful information about the proposed risk factors. Therefore, I start 
with the 6 portfolios as the initial test assets and they are notated as SL, SM, SH, BL, BM, and 
BH. 27  I also let 𝑅𝑡, 𝑍𝑡 and 𝑆𝑡 denote the vectors contain the excess returns on the test assets, the 
chosen state variables, and the sentiment measures at month t, individually. Finally, 𝐷𝑡, the risk 
                                                 
 
 
26For example, authors like Brown and Cliff (2004), Klein and Zwergel (2006) belong to the first branch and use 
explicitly sentiment data sets, such as investor sentiment surveys. On the other hand, Neal and Wheatley (1998) start 
the second branch and they use three popular market ratios as indicators of investor sentiment. Using a similar way 
to approach market sentiment, Baker and Wurgler (2007) construct a sentiment indicator based on typical sentiment 
proxies though the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). 
27 As usual, S and B denote “small” and “big” in firm size, respectively. Similarly, L, M, and H denote “low”, 
“medium”, and “high” in the BTM ratio, respectively.   
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factor vector, contains the three proposed risk factors, market return (𝐷𝑡
𝑀𝐾𝑇), change in future 
investment opportunity set (𝐷𝑡
∆𝑂𝑃𝑃), and sentiment (𝐷𝑡
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇), at month t.28 
 
By my AICAPM, returns on the 6 portfolios should be well explained by the 3 risk 
factors specified above. In other words,   
    𝑅𝑡 = 𝐵
𝑅𝐷𝑡 +𝑊𝑡
𝑅                                                      (1)                                                 
where 𝐵𝑅 is a 6x3 constant factor-load matrix, and 𝑊𝑡
𝑅 is a vector of idiosyncratic returns on the 
6 portfolios.  
 
For identification purpose, I assume that the chosen indicators only contain information 
about the corresponding risk factors. Thus, the relation between the market return indicator and 
the proposed risk factors can be simply given as:   
                             𝑟𝑚.𝑡 = 𝛽
𝑟𝑚𝐷𝑡 +𝑊𝑡
𝑟𝑚                                                        (2)                                                            
where 𝛽𝑟𝑚 is a 1x3 vector of factor-loading with the last two elements are fixed to be zeros and 
𝑊𝑡
𝑟𝑚 is the idiosyncratic return on the return on the CRSP index.  
 
I compute innovations that believed to describe the change in the investment opportunity 
set (𝐷𝑡
∆𝑜𝑝𝑝.𝑠𝑒𝑡) by specifying an AR (1) process for each state variable. Then, the relation 
between the innovations and the risk factors can be shown as: 
                                                 
 
 
28 𝑅𝑡 ≡ [𝑟𝑠𝑙,𝑡 , 𝑟𝑠𝑚,𝑡  , 𝑟𝑠ℎ,𝑡 ,  𝑟𝑏𝑙,𝑡 , 𝑟𝑏𝑚,𝑡 , 𝑟𝑏ℎ,𝑡  ]
′
; 𝑍𝑡 ≡ [𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡 ,  𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑡 , 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚,  𝑟𝑓𝑡  ]
′;  𝑆𝑡 ≡ [𝐼𝐼𝑡 ,  𝐵𝑊𝑡  ]




𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇]′; all the values used in the model are demeaned first.  
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𝑍𝑡 = 𝐴𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝐵
𝑧𝐷𝑡 +𝑊𝑡
𝑍                                                        (3) 
where 𝐴 and 𝐵𝑧 are 4x4 and 4x3 constant factor-loading matrices, respectively, and 𝑊𝑡
𝑍 is a 
vector that contains idiosyncratic errors for the systemic variables. Since the innovations are 
obtained by an AR (1) process for each state variable, A is a diagonal matrix. Additionally, these 
innovations are assumed to model the change in the investment opportunity set (𝐷𝑡
∆𝑜𝑝𝑝.𝑠𝑒𝑡) 
exclusively, the factor-loadings on the first and third columns of 𝐵𝑧 are restricted to be zeros. 
 
Finally, the sentiment indicators, II and BW, are assumed to measure investor sentiment 
(𝐷𝑡
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖) only, and their relationship with the risk factors can be represented by:  
𝑆𝑡 = 𝐵
𝑆𝐷𝑡 +𝑊𝑡
𝑆                                                                  (4) 
where 𝐵𝑆 is a 2x3 constant factor-loading matrix with zero loadings on the first two columns, 
and 𝑊𝑡
𝑆 is a vector that contains idiosyncratic errors for the two indicators. 
 
Combining equations 1 to 4, the measurement equation for the state space representation 
of my proposed model can be easily expressed in matrix form by the following system of 











] [𝐷𝑡] +𝑊𝑡                                                  (5) 
where 𝑌𝑡 ≡ [𝑅𝑡
′ , 𝑟𝑚,𝑡, 𝑍𝑡
′, 𝑆𝑡
′]′ is the dependent vector contains the demeaned values of the excess 
returns on the initial test assets, excess return on the CRSP index, state variables, and sentiment 









Furthermore, my transition equation is assumed to be in the following matrix form:  
𝐷𝑡 = Φ𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑉𝑡                                                                      (6) 
where Φ is a 3x3 diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements consist of AR(1) coefficients, 
𝜙𝑀𝐾𝑇 ,  𝜙∆𝑂𝑃𝑃 , 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝜙𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇, that capture the time-series predictability of the three risk factors; 𝐶𝑡 
is a 3x1 vector with the first two elements are set to be zeroes and the third element, 𝑑𝑡, is 
specified as: 𝑑𝑡 = 𝜃1𝐻𝐿𝐹2𝑡 − 𝜃2𝐻𝐿𝐹2𝑡−1 + 𝜃3𝐷𝑃𝑡 − 𝜃4𝐷𝑃𝑡−1 + 𝜃5𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 − 𝜃6𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡−1, 29 
where 𝜃2 = 𝜙
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇 . 𝜃1, 𝜃4 = 𝜙
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇 . 𝜃3 and 𝜃6 = 𝜙
𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇 . 𝜃5. As a result,  𝑑𝑡 captures the initial 
change in investor sentiment caused by an upcoming presidential election and a Democratic 
election victory, along with the initial impact from the unprecedented financial crisis of 2007-
2008.  
 
I also make the following conventional assumptions for 𝑊𝑡 and 𝑉𝑡 that both 𝑊𝑡 and 𝑉𝑡 










]]                                                     (7) 
where the covariance matrices, Ω𝑊 and Ω𝑉, are assumed to be in a diagonal shape. Besides, I 




2 = 1). Finally, by construction, the 3 proposed risk factors are mutually 
uncorrelated (i.e., diagonal Φ and Ω), with zero means and unit residual variances.30 
 
                                                 
 
 
29 𝑌𝑟34, 𝐷𝑃 and 𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠 are dummy variables which are discussed in section III. 
30 Under the assumptions in equation 7, the Kalman filter is a statistically optimal procedure to extract the 
unobserved factors from a finite set if observed returns. The procedures for extracting the factors via the Kalman 




Following Santa-Clare and Valkanov (2003), I divide my data set into four categories: 
return series, systematic variables, dummy variables, and sentiment measures. All the series are 
at monthly frequency and span from 1965:07 to 2010:12. During the period, there are 11 
presidential elections, 4 Democratic and 5 Republican administrations. 
 
2.4.1. Return Series 
The test assets employed in this study are the portfolios formed by the intersection of 
market value of equity (size) with ratio of book value of equity to market value of equity (BTM). 
Return series on the portfolios are collected from Professor Kenneth R. French’s website.31 
Monthly returns on 30-day T-bill rate from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
are used to calculate the excess returns. 
 
2.4.2. State Variables 
The four chosen state variables to capture the uncertainty in investment opportunity set 
are the dividend yield of the CRSP value-weighted portfolio (computed as the sum of dividends 
over the last 12 months, divided by the level of the index), the term spread (the difference 
between the yields of a 10-year and a 1-year government bond), the default spread (the 
difference between the yields on Moody’s Baa-rated corporate bonds and Moody’s Aaa-rated 






corporate bonds), and the short term interest rate (1-month T-bill rate). Data on bond yields are 
from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
 
2.4.3. Dummy Variables 
To capture the effects of the presidential partisan cycle and presidential election cycle, I 
define the following political indicators: 
 𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 1 if a Democrat is in the White House at time t; 𝐷𝑃𝑡 = 0 otherwise. 
 𝐻𝐿𝐹2𝑡 = 1 if time t is in the second half of a presidency before an election;  𝐻𝐿𝐹2𝑡 = 0 
otherwise. 
Furthermore, to control for the impact of the unprecedented financial crisis in 2007-2008 in 
the U.S. stock market, I define the following crisis indicator: 
𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 1 if time t is in the period of 2007 to 2008;  𝐶𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑠𝑡 = 0 otherwise. 
 
2.4.4. Investor Sentiment Measures 
This study utilizes both direct and indirect measures to capture investor sentiment. The 
indirect measure is the composite index created by Baker and Wurgler (2007).  Baker and 
Wurgler (2006) create their sentiment index as the first principal component of six common 
investor sentiment proxies: closed-end fund discounts; NYSE share turnover; the number of 
initial public offerings (IPO); average first-day IPO returns; the percentage of equity in new 
issues; and the dividend premium between dividend-paying and dividend-non-paying firms. To 
distinguish between a common sentiment component and a common business cycle component, 
a new index is constructed in 2007 by explicitly removing business cycle variation from each of 
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the six proxies prior to the principal components analysis. This index is available at monthly 
frequency from July 1965 to December 2010 from Professor Jeffrey Wurgler’s website.32 
 
 Investors’ Intelligence (II), on the other hand, provides a direct sentiment measure. The 
editors of Investors’ Intelligence assess the stance of authors on the stock market for over a 
hundred of independent market newsletters every week. 33  These letters are categorized into 
three groups: bullish, bearish, or correction. The bull-bear spread, which is calculated from II 
survey results as the percentage of bullish sentiment minus the percentage of bearish sentiment, 
is widely used by the financial press, for example, Barron’s and The Wall Street Journal. 
Consequently, I use bull-bear spread as well for the study. To match the monthly frequency of 
composite index, I assume that the month-end sentiment prevails throughout the month. 
 
 
2.5.  Empirical Results 
2.5.1. Descriptive Statistics and Estimated Parameters  
The descriptive statistics in Panel A of Table 1 provide an initial view of the presidential 
election cycle effect and presidential partisan cycle effect on the excess returns for the 6 
portfolios. As can be seen that the average excess returns are higher during Democratic 
presidencies and elections years (second half of a presidency), respectively. Compared to the 
big-stock group (portfolios formed by stocks with large market capitalization), the differentials 








in mean returns are more evident for the small-stock group (portfolios formed by stocks have 
small market capitalization). Furthermore, it can be seen that the return differentials are most 
significant for the portfolio formed by growth stocks, stocks with a low level of BTM ratio, in 
the small-stock group; while the differentials are smallest for the portfolio formed by stocks with 
a medium level of BTM ratio in the big-stock group. Overall, the cycle effects exhibit most 
influences over returns on growth stocks with small capitalization but exhibit less impact on 
returns on big stocks with a medium BTM ratio. 
 
Panel B of Table 1 presents the maximum likelihood estimates for parameters in the 
state-space model specified above.34 Nearly all the parameter estimates are statistically 
significant at the 1% level with the unreported t-value (absolute) are several times larger than 
1.96. These results suggest that the excess returns on the 6 portfolios used as test assets largely 
conform to the 3-dimensional factor structure proposed for the study.   
 
Specifically, when holding the BTM ratio, the loadings on the market factor (𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇)  are 
significantly larger in the small-small group than in the big-stock group. This suggests that the 
market factor captures well the notion that small stocks are relatively riskier than big stocks. 
Furthermore, the factor loadings display a decreasing trend with the BTM ratio for both groups 
providing evidence of the growth and value effects. As for the loadings on the factor of change in 
investment opportunity set (𝐷∆𝑂𝑃𝑃), the positive loadings in the small-stock group indicate that 
                                                 
 
 
34 For brevity, the parameters for generating the innovations in the systematic variables are exclude from the table. 
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returns on small stocks are positively exposed to the factor of change in investment opportunity 
set; while the native loadings in the big-stock group suggest that returns on big stock are 
generally inversely related to this risk factor. The magnitude of the factor loadings decreases 
with the BTM ratio in the small-stock group but increases with the BTM ratio in the big-stock 
group. This is in line with the market folklore that stocks with large capitalization and 
undervalued by the market may provide the desired hedging effect against the potential changes 
in the investment opportunity set. Previous studies find that investor sentiment affects more on 
stocks whose valuations are highly subjective and are difficult to arbitrage. Some of the 
characterizations of those stocks including small in market value or have an extreme BTM ratio. 
In this study, the loadings on the sentiment factor are highly statistically significant for all the 
test assets except for the one (BL) formed by stocks with large market capitalization and a low 
BTM ratio.35 As expected, the loadings on the sentiment factor in the small-stock group are 
several times larger than in the big-stock group. Moreover, the factor loadings found to be largest 
for the portfolios formed by value stocks, stocks with a high BTM ratio, for both size groups.  
 
Except for the default spread, the estimates on the state variables are all statistically 
significant. Return on the CRPS index is found to be closely related to the market factor. The 
positive factor loading is both statistically and economically significant. Besides, the estimates 
show that the unexpected dividend yield and short-term interest rate (T-bill Rate) are positively 
                                                 
 
 
35 One possible explanation for the insignificant factor loading is that stocks consisted in the BL portfolio are 
commonly the blue chip stocks, stocks issued by well-established firms. Compared to other stocks, blue stocks have 




related to the factor of change in investment opportunity set; while the unexpected term spread is 
negatively correlated with the factor. Finally, the factor loadings on the two sentiment measures 
show that the composite index of Baker and Wurlger (2007), the indirect measure, found to be 
inversely related to the sentiment factor. There is, however, a positive correlation between the 
direct measure (II) and the sentiment factor. Furthermore, compared to the composite index, the 
factor loading on the direct measure is statistically more significant. Chau, Deesomsak, and 
Koutmos (2016) also find that sentiment-driven investors are more apt to trade on survey-based 
indicators rather than market-based indicators.   
 
As for the predictability of the dynamic factors, results in Panel B of Table 1 show that 
the AR (1) coefficients on the three factors specified in equation (6) are all statistically 
significant at the conventional levels. A change in the factor realizations by one standard 
deviation in the current month will affect the unobserved factor realizations by 8.1% to 14.6% in 
the next month. More importantly, the estimates on the dummy variables representing the 
election years (HLF2) and the 2007-2008 financial crisis are statistically significant at the 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. Nevertheless, the estimate on the dummy variable representing the 
time when the White House is controlled by a Democrat (DEMO) is not significantly different 
from zero.  
 
The positive estimate on HLF2 implies that the market generally tends to feel more 
optimistic during the second half of a presidential term before an election. Furthermore, this pre-
election surge in investor sentiment is found to be responsible for a significant portion of the 
presidential election cycle effect in the U.S. stock market. To put this key finding of the study in 
83 
 
perspective, Figure 1 demonstrates how much of the presidential election cycle effect on excess 
returns of the 6 test assets can be attributed to the change in returns caused by the improved 
sentiment before elections. From the figure, we can see that the additional return stemmed from 
the pre-election upsurge in investor sentiment is responsible for a significant share of the 
presidential election effect. In particular, in the small-stock group, the sentiment induced returns 
found to contribute more than 40% of the return difference for SH (42.7%), close to 40% for SM 
(37.4%) and nearly 30% for SL (28.9%), respectively. Although stocks with large market 
capitalization are less subject to investor sentiment, the additional returns generated by the 
improved sentiment before an election are found to be responsible for more than 15% of the 
difference for BH (15.9%) and almost 10% for BM (8.9%). Figure 2 shows that the extracted 
sentiment roughly lines up with the anecdotal accounts of fluctuations in the U.S. stock market 
during the sample period. For instance, the sentiment factor captures the major bear markets 
in1968 to 1970, 1973 to 1974, 1980 to 1982, October 1987, 2000 to 2002, and 2007 to 2009. It 
also coincides with the bull markets in the 1960s (The go-go years), the 1970s (The Nifty Fifty), 
the Roaring 90s, and the housing boom (2002-2007). This correspondence with the anecdotal 
accounts seems to confirm that my sentiment factor captures the intended variation. Finally, the 
negative estimate on the dummy variable for the financial crisis in 2007 and 2008 are both 
economically and statistically significant, which confirms that there was a market-wide panic 








2.6. Testing the Augmented ICAPM (AICAPM) 
From this section, I focus on testing the AICAPM and compare it with other alternative 
models. For expositional convenience, I first conduct in-sample tests in this section and then 
perform out-of-sample tests in the following section.  
2.6.1. Competing with the ICAPM of Merton (1973) 
Following Cochrane (2005) and Brennan et al. (2004), I conduct the asset pricing tests to the 
AICAPM using the 25 size- and BTM -sorted portfolios as test assets through the 2-pass 
regressions. 
A. Time-Series Regressions 
The first pass of the 2-pass regression procedure is to estimate the factor loadings with 
respect to the three proposed risk factors by running a multiple time-series regression. 
Specifically, I run the following time-series regression for each asset: 






𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡                               (8) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the excess return on portfolio 𝑖 (𝑖 = 𝑃11,… , 𝑃55).
36   
 
Panel A of Table 2 contains the estimated risk exposures to the proposed risk factors in the 
model from the time-series regression for the 25 portfolios. For comparison purposes, the 
corresponding results for the ICAPM are reported in Panel B.37 Note that the loadings for the 
                                                 
 
 
36 For example, P11 stands for the portfolio formed by the stocks with the smallest size and the lowest BTM ratio. 
While, P55 stands for the portfolio formed by the stocks with the biggest size and the highest BTM ratio. 
37 The risk factors in the conventional ICAPM are also estimated from the proposed state-space model but without 
including the sentiment factor. 
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AICAPM are all statistically significant at the 1% level. Given the statistical significance levels 
of the loadings, it is less likely that the second step results are subject to the “useless” factor 
problem described by Kan and Zhang (1999). Still, to formally test the null hypothesis of jointly 
zero coefficients on the three risk factors, I conduct the F-test in a seemingly unrelated regression 
(SUR) system for the 25 portfolios. The test strongly rejects the null hypothesis and show that 
loadings on the proposed risk factors are jointly significant, with the corresponding P-values 
being close to zero. The loadings on the sentiment factor unequivocally demonstrate that investor 
sentiment has a crucial role in explaining returns. In particular, the explanatory power of the 
sentiment factor is much higher for the extreme portfolios, the ones that the traditional models 
have difficulty in explaining. For instance, the average of absolute loadings on the sentiment 
factor for portfolios with the smallest stocks (P11, P12, P13, P14, and P15) is more than ten 
times as large as for portfolios formed by the biggest stocks (P51, P52, P53, P54, and P55). Also, 
compared to the ICAPM, the average adjusted 𝑅2𝑠 (Avg.𝑅2) is higher for the AICAPM, while 
the average standard errors (Avg. s(u)) is lower. It should be noted that much of the improvement 
of the AICAPM is from the portfolios where the sentiment factor displays stronger explanatory 
power. Overall, these results suggest that the risk factors in the ICAPM alone cannot fully 
capture the return variation over time.   
 
 
B. Cross-Sectional Regressions 
The second step in the 2-pass regression procedure is to relate the average excess returns of 
the test assets to their risk exposures estimated from the time-series regressions. Thus, I cross-
sectionally regress the sample mean of monthly excess returns on the estimated factor loadings 









3̂+𝑒𝑖                                             (9) 
where 𝑅?̅? is the mean excess return on portfolio 𝑖 (𝑖 = 𝑃11,… , 𝑃55), 𝛽𝑖
𝑗
?̂? are the estimated 
loadings on the three risk factors (𝑗 = 1,2, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 3) from the time-series regressions the first  pass,  
𝜆𝑖s denote the coefficients to be estimated as factor risk premiums, and 𝑒𝑖 is the residual term 
that measures the pricing error of the AICAPM for portfolio 𝑖.  
 
Panel C of Table 2 reports the estimated factor risk premium (𝑃𝑅𝐸𝑀) and pricing errors 
(𝑒s). The levels of the risk premiums for the three proposed risk factors are -0.100%-0.194% and 
is statistically significant at any conventional level. The significant price of risk associated with 
the proposed risk factors suggests that the 3 factors in the AICAPM are indeed important 
determinants of average returns. The monthly risk premiums for the ICAPM in Panel D, on the 
other hand, show that after excluding the sentiment factor, the size of the premium for the market 
return in the ICAPM (.122%) is about three times larger than what is in the AICAPM (0.042%), 
and the premium for the factor of change in investment opportunity set becomes statistically 
insignificant.  
 
Panel C of Table 3 also indicates that, in general, the pricing errors (𝑒s) of the AICAPM 
are much smaller (especially in the extreme portfolios) compared to those of the ICAPM 
reported in Panel D. It follows that the average absolute error (AAE) is down by almost 50% 
from 16.50 basis points (bp) to 11.40 bp per month, and the sum of the squared errors (SSE) 
decreases from 1.351 to 0.638. Notably, the decrease in pricing errors mainly occurs in the 
corner portfolios. For example, the pricing error in the growth portfolio (P31) for the AICAPM is 
only 0.029% per month, while its counterpart is -0.322% in the ICAPM.  The reduction in the 
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pricing errors is mainly because of the explanatory power of the loading on the sentiment factor. 
Given the incremental role of the sentiment factor, it is evident that the AICAPM outperforms 
the ICAPM. 
 
Overall, the above analyses reveal that the proposed risk factors in the AICAPM are a 
vital component in asset pricing. The asset pricing tests show that the superior explanatory power 
of the AICAPM stems from the fact that the loadings on the traditional risk factors in the ICAPM 
alone do not fully incorporate all the relevant information. Once the bias is adjusted by including 
the psychological factor into the model, the AICAPM can better explain expected returns than 
the ICAPM. 
 
2.6.2.  Competing with the Fama and French (1993) 3-factor (FF3) Model 
One concern in the above analyses is that the better performance of the AICAPM over 
the traditional ICAPM may be primarily driven by the additional risk factor, 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇, used in the 
model. To address this issue, another competing model that also has three risk factors is 
considered in the study. The Fama and French (1993) 3-factor (FF3) model has been one of the 
most popular benchmarks in the modern empirical asset pricing literature. Also using 3 risk 
factors, MKT, SMB and HML, the FF3 has been found to be able to explain most of the cross-
sectional variation in the average returns of portfolios sorted by the size and BTM.  
 
For comparison purposes, I again apply the 2-pass regression procedure to the FF3 model 
using the same 25 portfolios as the test assets. The adjusted 𝑅2s from the time-series regressions 
and the pricing errors (𝑒s) from the cross-sectional regressions are reported in Table 3. As can be 
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seen that, on average, the adjusted 𝑅2s are lower and the standard errors are higher for the FF3 
model. However, the average absolute error (AAE) and the sum of squared errors (SSE) are 
nearly identical for both models. On balance, the in-sample test results seem to suggest that the 
AICAPM somewhat outperforms the benchmark model (the FF3 model). It should be recognized 
that the better pricing ability of the AICAPM over the FF3 mainly occurs in the extreme 
portfolios such as the portfolios made of the stocks with the smallest market capitalization. The 
same portfolios are more likely to be affected by investor sentiment.  
 
 
2.7. Out-of-Sample Tests 
 In the previous section, I have shown that my AICAPM outperforms the ICAPM as well 
as the FF3 model, and all the proposed risk factors play a crucial role in explaining returns. 
However, these results are in the context of in-sample tests. From the perspective of investors, 
however, being able to obtain more accurate forecasts is very important in a variety of setting. In 
this section, therefore, I focus on the performance of my AICAPM in the out-of-sample context. 
Specifically, I make pair-wise comparisons of the accuracy in 1-step-ahead forecasts. In 
comparing the accuracy of the forecasts, I first use the following two competing models: 1) 
AICAPM, 2) ICAPM. Given the concern that the better performance of the AICAPM may be 
achieved by including an additional factor, I also consider a 3-factor model as follows: 3) FF3.  
 
I again use the 25 size-and BTM-sorted portfolios as test assets. For this purpose, the first 
273 months (1965:07-1988:03) of my whole sample period (546 months: 1965:07-2010:12) are 
used as training period in order to estimate the first set of model parameters. The first 1-step-
ahead forecast is the computed for April 1988 using the estimated model parameters. The 1-step-
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ahead forecasts for the remaining 272 months (1988:05-2010:012) are also computed based on 
the model parameters estimated using the relevant data from the 273-month rolling windows, 
resulting in the total 273 forecasts (1988:04-2010:12) for each model. 
 
For pair-wise comparisons between the competing models, the average of differentials in 





2 ]𝑇𝑡 , where 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
is time 𝑡 forecast error of model 𝑖 (i.e.,𝑢𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − ?̂?𝑖,𝑡|𝑡−1, where ?̂?𝑖,𝑡|𝑡−1 is the forecast of 
excess returns 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 at time 𝑡)  and 𝑇 is the total month number of the forecasts (273). In a 
comparison pair, AICAPM versus ICAPM, for instance, 𝑢1,𝑡 is the forecast error of the AICAPM 
and 𝑢2,𝑡 is the forecast error of the ICAPM. Following Simin (2008), I compute DM-STAT 
based on Diebold and Mariano (1995) to test the null hypothesis of 𝐻𝑜: 𝑑 ̅ = 0. This test statistic 





                                                       (10) 
where 𝑓𝑑 (0) is a consistent spectral density of [𝑢1,𝑡
2 − 𝑢2,𝑡
2 ] at frequency 0 and 2𝜋 𝑇⁄  is the 
length of time required for the process to repeat a full cycle. To examine if the average of ?̅?𝑠 is 
0, we also conduct the overall t-test for each of the pairs using ?̅?𝑠 obtained from the 25 
portfolios.  
 
The results are reported in Table 4. Given my AICAPM is essentially an extended 
version of the ICAPM; I first compare the predictive ability of the AICAPM with that of the 
ICAPM. As panel A indicate, the average MSFE differentials (?̅?𝑠) of the pair (AICAPM vs. 
ICAPM) are mostly negative, and many of them are statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Moreover, the overall t-test shows that ?̅?s are negative on average and statistically different from 
zero at the 1% level. This clearly indicates that the AICAPM does a better job than the ICAPM 
in the 1-step-ahead forecasts. Specifically, the better predictive ability of the AICAPM over the 
ICAPM occurs predominately in the portfolios formed by the smallest stocks. The portfolios are 
precisely the ones that are most sensitive to investor sentiment. 
 
To address the issue of whether the better predictive power of the AICAPM over the 
ICAPM may be primarily driven by using an additional factor (𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇) in the model, the 
AICAPM is again compared with the FF-3 model. The results presented in Panel B show that ?̅?s 
in many portfolios are negative (17 cases out of the 25 portfolios) and statistically significant at 
the 1% level. The overall t-test indicates the ?̅?𝑠 are negative on average and significant at the 1% 
percent level, demonstrating that my AICAPM provides more accurate forecasts than the FF3. 
As can be seen that the superior predictive ability of the AICAPM over the FF3 model occurs 
primarily for the portfolios formed by growth stocks. The same stocks that found to have greater 
exposure to the sentiment risk by earlier studies.  
 
To sum up, the AICAPM outperforms both competing models in the out-of-sample tests. 
Results from the asset pricing analyses provide irrefutable evidence that the 3 proposed risk 
factors (𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇, 𝐷∆𝑂𝑃𝑃, and 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇) all play a critical role in describing and forecasting asset 
returns. I further conjecture that the better explanatory and predictive power of my proposed 
model can be largely accredited to the high explanatory and predictive power of the loading on 






In the discussion of the relationship between the elections and the stock market returns in 
the United States, the role of investor sentiment is mostly ignored by existing research. In this 
study, I develop a dynamic factor model to study the relationships among presidential elections, 
investor sentiment, and stock market returns simultaneously. Results from the model unveil that 
there is a significant rising in market optimism in the election years prior to an election. More 
importantly, this pre-election improvement of investor sentiment found to account for a 
substantial share of the observed presidential election cycle effect in the U.S. stock market.  
However, data in the paper fail to find significant evidence that Democratic presidents install 
more optimism in the stock market. My result, on the other hand, does confirm that there was a 
market-wide panic during the height of the recent financial crisis.  
 
Furthermore, with the extracted factors, I conduct asset pricing tests in both the in-sample 
context and out-of-sample context for the proposed model. The test results show that the risk 
factors in the model all are a crucial component in asset pricing and prediction. In particular, the 
high explanatory and predictive power of the loadings on the sentiment factor leads the AICAPM 
in the study to outperform other competing models such the ICAPM and the FF3 model in both 
































Portions of the Presidential Election Effect in the Stock Returns can be attributed to 
the Pre-Election Surge in Investor Sentiment and Other Reasons
Extra Returns Caused by the Pre-Election Surge in Sentment Extra Returns Casued by Other Reasons
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Table 2.1 Maximum Likelihood Estimates for the Model  
Panel A of Table 1 reports the means of excess returns on the 6 initial test assets across parties and throughout presidential 
terms from 1965:07-2010:12. Panel B reports the maximum likelihood estimation of the parameters for the proposed model 
obtained using the Kalman filter. 
 
 
REP DEM DEM-REP HLF1 HLF2 HLF2-HLF1
SL -0.387 1.185 1.572 SL -0.426 1.334 1.760
SM 0.286 1.326 1.040 SM 0.217 1.470 1.253
SH 0.585 1.619 1.034 SH 0.513 1.766 1.253
BL -0.012 0.615 0.627 BL -0.150 0.804 0.954
BM 0.090 0.306 0.216 BM -0.020 0.763 0.783
BH 0.057 0.831 0.774 BH -0.003 0.948 0.951
SL 6.916 *** 2.430 *** 3.313 *** 1.961 ***
SM 4.525 *** 0.360 ** 3.047 *** 0.174 ***
SH 3.863 *** 0.068 * 3.478 *** 1.364 ***
BL 5.722 *** 0.750 *** 0.025 0.100
BM 3.400 *** -1.641 *** 0.456 *** 0.423 ***
BH 3.095 *** -2.045 *** 0.979 *** 1.579 ***
4.200 *** 1.057 ***
Div.Yield 0.097 *** 0.015 ***
Term -0.037 *** 0.075 ***
Default -0.002 0.013 ***
T-bill Rate 0.007 *** 0.004 ***
BW -0.080 ** 0.035 ***
II 0.052 *** 0.887 ***
0.125 *** 0.081 * 0.146 ***
HLF2 0.154 ** DEMO 0.008 CRISIS -0.716 ***
Panel A. Descriptive Statistics about the 6 portfolios formed on Size and BTM
Panel B. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Parameters for the Model 
*,** and *** indicate coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively .
𝐷𝑀𝐾𝑇 𝐷∆𝑂𝑃𝑃 𝐷𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇 𝜎2
𝑅𝑀
 𝐾𝑀𝑇  ∆𝑂𝑃𝑃  𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇
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Table 2.2 Two-Pass Regression Results to Test the Augmented Intertemporal Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (AICAPM) 
Panel A contains the 1st-step results that include the estimates of the factor loadings on the proposed risk factors and adjusted 
𝑅2 (Adj. 𝑅2) for each of the 25 portfolios, and the averaged values of adjusted 𝑅2 (Avg. 𝑅2) and standard errors (Avg. 𝑠(𝑢)) 





Portfolios   Adj. Portfolios   Adj.
P11 6.641 *** 2.630 *** 4.477 *** 0.937 P11 6.692 *** 4.439 *** 0.851
P12 5.723 *** 1.333 *** 4.150 *** 0.971 P12 6.040 *** 3.693 *** 0.941
P13 5.212 *** 0.478 *** 3.880 *** 0.981 P13 5.696 *** 3.128 *** 0.977
P14 4.648 *** 0.167 *** 3.731 ** 0.973 P14 5.178 *** 2.875 *** 0.957
P15 4.732 *** -0.044 4.178 *** 0.943 P15 5.367 *** 3.003 *** 0.895
P21 7.046 *** 1.974 *** 2.150 *** 0.947 P21 6.706 *** 2.365 *** 0.823
P22 5.904 *** 0.255 ** 2.177 *** 0.947 P22 6.036 *** 1.609 *** 0.932
P23 5.149 *** -0.633 *** 2.042 *** 0.933 P23 5.482 *** 1.093 *** 0.938
P24 4.799 *** -1.078 *** 2.013 *** 0.928 P24 5.222 *** 0.827 *** 0.918
P25 5.399 *** -1.403 *** 2.629 *** 0.912 P25 5.965 *** 1.108 *** 0.883
P31 6.790 *** 1.748 *** 1.114 *** 0.958 P31 6.260 *** 1.471 *** 0.786
P32 5.520 *** -0.439 *** 1.187 *** 0.937 P32 5.607 *** 0.417 *** 0.924
P33 4.898 *** -1.107 *** 1.206 *** 0.940 P33 5.175 *** 0.098 0.945
P34 4.559 *** -1.578 *** 1.271 *** 0.936 P34 4.949 *** -0.086 0.92
P35 5.127 *** -1.791 *** 1.779 *** 0.889 P35 5.598 *** 0.204 *** 0.855
P41 6.113 *** 1.239 *** 0.165 *** 0.977 P41 5.521 *** 0.450 0.77
P42 5.210 *** -1.032 *** 0.409 *** 0.945 P42 5.281 *** -0.561 *** 0.94
P43 4.839 *** -1.643 *** 0.642 *** 0.956 P43 5.122 *** -0.727 *** 0.965
P44 4.553 *** -1.825 *** 0.769 *** 0.939 P44 4.874 *** -0.649 *** 0.921
P45 5.289 *** -2.123 *** 1.345 *** 0.877 P45 5.692 *** -0.273 * 0.83
P51 5.195 *** 0.560 *** -0.669 *** 0.957 P51 4.593 *** -0.519 *** 0.736
P52 4.615 *** -1.024 *** -0.213 ** 0.942 P52 4.558 *** -1.025 *** 0.919
P53 4.195 *** -1.775 *** -0.103 0.935 P53 4.363 *** -1.355 *** 0.94
P54 4.145 *** -2.238 *** 0.284 *** 0.920 P54 4.469 *** -1.225 *** 0.888
P55 4.363 *** -2.049 *** 0.476 *** 0.777 P55 4.614 *** -0.968 *** 0.736
F-TEST >100 *** >100 *** >100 *** F-TEST >100 *** >100 ***
Avg. 0.934 Avg. 0.888
Avg. s(u) 1.525 Avg. s(u) 1.960
Other Statistics Other Statistics 
*,** and *** indicate coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively .
Panel B Time-Series Regression Results for ICAPM Panel A Time-Series Regression Results for AICAPM





Table 2.2 (Continued) 
Panel C contains the results from the 2nd step, which involves cross-sectionally regressing the sample mean of monthly excess 
returns on the estimated factor loadings from the 1st step. 𝜆 is the estimated factor premiums (PREM), and 𝑒 is the residual 
term that measures the pricing error of the AICAPM. For comparison purpose, the cross-sectional regression results from the 
ICAPM are also reported in Panel D. AAE stands for the average absolute error, and SEE stands for the sum of squared errors.  
 
 
PREM(in %) PREM (in %)
0.040 *** -0.100 *** 0.194 *** 0.1222 *** 0.050
Portfolios e(in %) Portfolios e(in %)
P11 -0.426 P11 -0.533
P12 -0.006 P12 0.023
P13 0.026 P13 0.137
P14 0.198 P14 0.355
P15 0.355 P15 0.584
P21 -0.183 P21 -0.469
P22 0.010 P22 -0.045
P23 0.070 P23 0.127
P24 0.011 P24 0.132
P25 -0.057 P25 0.140
P31 0.029 P31 -0.322
P32 0.103 P32 0.047
P33 -0.040 P33 0.005
P34 0.038 P34 0.157
P35 0.143 P35 0.314
P41 0.250 P41 -0.107
P42 -0.033 P42 -0.082
P43 -0.078 P43 -0.019
P44 -0.009 P44 0.093
P45 -0.113 P45 0.046
P51 0.197 P51 -0.128
P52 0.043 P52 -0.041
P53 -0.057 P53 -0.029
P54 -0.282 P54 -0.165
P55 -0.086 P55 0.023
AAE 0.114 AAE 0.165
SEE 0.638 SEE 1.351
Panel C Cross-Section Regression Results for AICAPM Panel D Cross-Section Regression Results for ICAPM
Other Statistics Other Statistics 
*,** and *** indicate coefficents are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively .





Table 2.3 Two-Pass Regression Results for the Fama-French (1993) 3-Factor (FF3) Model 
Panel A contains the 1st-step results that include the adjusted 𝑅2 (Adj. 𝑅2) for each of the 25 portfolios, and the 
averaged values of adjusted 𝑅2 (Avg. 𝑅2) and standard errors (Avg. 𝑠(𝑢)) after running the time-series regressions. 
Panel C contains the results from the 2nd step, which involves cross-sectionally regressing the sample mean of 
monthly excess returns on the estimated factor loadings from the 1st step. 𝑒 is the residual term that measures the 




Portfolios   Adj. Portfolios e(in %)
P11 0.804 P11 -0.366
P12 0.857 P12 0.039
P13 0.868 P13 0.081
P14 0.879 P14 0.225
P15 0.837 P15 0.384
P21 0.917 P21 -0.222
P22 0.924 P22 -0.020
P23 0.919 P23 0.035
P24 0.938 P24 -0.044
P25 0.937 P25 -0.143
P31 0.911 P31 -0.038
P32 0.902 P32 0.073
P33 0.898 P33 -0.058
P34 0.897 P34 0.013
P35 0.888 P35 0.079
P41 0.919 P41 0.210
P42 0.872 P42 -0.008
P43 0.865 P43 -0.042
P44 0.878 P44 0.007
P45 0.855 P45 -0.115
P51 0.939 P51 0.245
P52 0.903 P52 0.108
P53 0.872 P53 0.010
P54 0.882 P54 -0.224
P55 0.799 P55 -0.068
Avg. 0.886 AAE 0.114
Avg. s(u) 2.021 SSE 0.616
*,** and *** indicate coefficents are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively .
Other Statistics Other Statistics 





Table 2.4 Out-of-Sample Tests: Comparison of Accuracy in One-Step-Ahead Forecasts 
This table presents the pair-wise comparison of the accuracy in 1-step-ahead forecast from the competing models 
using 25 portfolios sorted by size and BTM. The competing models are 1) AICAPM, 2) ICAPM, and 3) FF3 
model. For pair-wise comparison between the competing models, the average of differentials in the mean squared 
forecast errors (MSFEs) is computed and DM-STAT is computed based on Diebold and Mariano (1995). 
 
Portfolios AICAPM vs. ICAPM 
P11 -17.988 *** -9.154 ***
P12 -9.599 *** -2.581 ***
P13 -7.030 *** -0.294 ***
P14 -4.646 *** -0.737 ***
P15 -6.836 *** -2.555 ***
P21 -4.000 * -9.730 ***
P22 -1.670 ** -0.639 **
P23 -1.023 0.376
P24 0.373 -0.193 *
P25 1.136 -1.333 ***
P31 -4.473 ** -12.949 ***
P32 -2.383 *** -0.448 **
P33 -2.192 *** 0.170
P34 -1.997 *** -0.351
P35 -0.943 -1.210 ***
P41 -3.445 *** -10.696 ***
P42 -3.787 *** 0.274
P43 -4.435 *** 0.268
P44 -2.318 *** -0.271 ***
P45 -1.352 * -1.812 ***
P51 -0.737 ** -7.345 ***
P52 -1.713 *** -0.415 ***
P53 -2.271 *** 0.097
P54 -1.712 *** -1.113 ***
P55 0.782 -0.960 ***
Mean -3.370 *** -2.544 ***
*,** and *** indicate coefficients are significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively .
 Average of Differentials in MSFEs
AICAPM vs. FF3
Panel B. Overall T-Test 
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The Kalman Filter as a Model of Conditional Expectations 
At the beginning of month t, investors make prior assessments about the conditional means and 
variances of the unobserved factors (𝐷𝑡) on the information set  𝐼𝑡−1, which have the following 
characteristics: 
Property 1 (Producing a Forecast of 𝐷𝑡 Based on 𝐼𝑡−1): In a conditional distribution 𝐷𝑡 | 𝐼𝑡−1  ∼
 𝑁(𝐷𝑡|𝑡−1, 𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1 ) and from Eq.(6), 
1) A vector of the ex-ante (prior) expectations of the unobserved true factors (𝐷𝑡) is given by 𝐷𝑡|𝑡−1 =
 𝛷𝐷𝑡−1|𝑡−1. 
2)  𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1 =  𝛷𝑃𝑡−1|𝑡−1𝛷
′ + Ω is a function of the population parameters (hence a constant matrix). 
3) 𝐷𝑡|𝑡−1 is the minimum mean squared error (MMSE) estimator of 𝐷𝑡 with respect to 𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1. 
At the end of month t, investors make contemporaneous (real-time) assessments about the 
conditional means and variances of the unobserved factors as the data (𝑅𝑡) are observed, leading to the 
following characteristics: 
Property 2. Updating the Inference about 𝐷𝑡 Based on 𝐼𝑡. In a conditional distribution 𝐷𝑡 | 𝐼𝑡 ∼
 𝑁(𝐷𝑡|𝑡 , 𝑃𝑡|𝑡), 
1) A vector of the ex-post (posterior) expectations of the true factors ( Dt) is given by 
𝐷𝑡|𝑡  =  𝐷𝑡|𝑡−1  +  𝐾𝑡𝑒𝑡|𝑡−1, 
where 𝐾𝑡  ≡  𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1𝐵
′𝛴𝑡|𝑡−1
−1  is the Kalman gain matrix (which is a function of the population parameters). 
In the Kalman gain matrix, 𝛴𝑡|𝑡−1  ≡  (𝐵𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1𝐵
′  + ∆) is the variance-covariance matrix of the forecast 
error, 𝑒 𝑡|𝑡−1 ≡  𝑅𝑡 − 𝑅𝑡|𝑡−1. 
2) 𝑃𝑡|𝑡 = 𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1 − 𝐾𝑡𝐵𝑃𝑡|𝑡−1 is a function of the population parameters (hence a constant 
matrix). 
3) 𝐷𝑡|𝑡  is the MMSE estimator of 𝐷𝑡 with respect to 𝑃𝑡|𝑡 
